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ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War, sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in early 1990s,
and the drastic changes they cause in the international system, induced a substantial
transformation ın the global scale and in the ambiguously bordered space called
Eurasia. Redefined international balances, posited the two regional powers who have
struggled for dominance in the region for centuries, against each other. The short-
lived Turkish-Soviet rapprochement during their respective revolutions at the
beginning of the century, and  the tensions of pre-World War II period ended with the
joining of Turkey to the anti-Soviet Western alliance ın 1952, and Cold War
polarisation determined the character of bilateral relations throughout the following
half of the century. As the USSR entered the process of collapse, Turkey began to
formulate policies towards the ex-Soviet republics which, seemed to escape Russian
attention, and tried to create a sphere of  influence particularly over the Turkic states.
Although theses efforts were frustrated by the end of relative Russian isolation in
1992-1993 and turning its attention back in the former Soviet territory, Ankara
succeeded in increasing its influence relatively in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In
mid-1990s, two regional powers, despite the continuation of the struggle over Eurasia,
managed to settle their bilateral relations over a strong basis.
Thıs work aims to examine the clash of interests of Turkey and Russia over
the former USSR territory besides their bilateral relations, and identify the major
areas of conflct and possibilities for co-operation.
ÖZET
Soğuk Savaş'ın bitişi, Sovyetler Birliği'nin 1990'ların başında ansızın
yıkılıvermesi ve bunların uluslararası sistemde yarattığı kökten değişiklikler, Küresel
çapta olduğu kadar Avrasya olarak adlandırılan sınırları belirsiz bölgede de büyük bir
dönüşüme yol açtı. Yeniden belirlenen uluslararası dengeler, yüzyıllarca birbirleriyle
bölgesel egemenlik için kıyasıya çekişen iki büyük bölge gücü Türkiye ve Rusya'yı
yeniden karşı karşıya bıraktı. İki ülkenin yüzyılın başında geçirdiği devrimler
sırasında oluşan kısa süreli Türk-Sovyet yakınlaşması ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı
öncesinde başlayan gerginleşme, Türkiye'nin 1952'de resmen Sovyet karşıtı batı
bağlaşımına katılmasıyla yeni bir aşamaya girmiş, sonraki yarım yüzyıla yakın sürede
ilişkilerin niteliğini Soğuk Savaş kutuplaşması belirlemişti. SSCB'nin yıkılma
sürecine girmesiyle Türkiye de Rusya gibi köklü bir dış politika dönüşümü yaşamaya
başladı ve kuzey komşusunun ilgi alanından çıkmış gibi görünen eski Sovyet
cumhuriyetlere yönelik politikalar üretmeye ve üzellikle Türk devletleri üzerinde bir
etki alanı yaratma çabasına girişti. Bu çabalar Rusya'nın 1992-1993 yıllarında dolaylı
yalıtımından cayıp yeniden eski Sovyet topraklarına ilgisini yöneltmesiyle düş
kırıklığı ile sona erdiyse de, Ankara Kafkaslar ve Orta Asya'da göreli olarak etkisini
arttırmayı başardı. İki bölgesel güç, 1990'ların ikinci yarısına doğru Avrasya
üzerindeki itişmelerini sürdürmekle birlikte ikili ilşkileri sağlam bir temele oturtmayı
bildiler.
İşbu çalışma, yukarıda belirtilen süreci izleyerek Türkiye ve Rusya arasındaki
ikili ilişkilerin yanısıra iki devletin eski SSCB toprakları üzerindeki dolaylı çıkar
çatışmalarını incelemeyi ve başlıca anlaşmazlık alanlarıyla, işbirliği olanaklarını
belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır.
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1INTRODUCTION
Turkey and Russia had been natural adversaries through ages, because of their
common geopolitical location, status and ambitions, therefore the expected friction caused 13
major wars and innumerable minor armed conflicts especially in the Black Sea, the Balkans
and the Caucasus1. As an Christian-Orthodox/Muslim entity, Russia became an alternative to
the Ottoman Empire in the region, which is itself an Christian-Orthodox/Muslim state. Russia,
consequent to the reforms of Peter the Great, continuously expanded towards south at
Ottoman expense, finally driving them out of the north of the Black Sea, the Caucasus and
most of the Balkan peninsula. Since then Russia is perceived as the biggest threat to the very
existence of Turkey. Tsar Nicholas I’s appeal to the English representative for partitioning of
the “Sick Man of Europe” in 1853 and active role of Moscow in the decline and partitioning
of the Ottoman Empire are still vivid memories.
Turkish-Russian relations display a continuous history of conflict, with the exception
of a few power balancing co-operation instances. The imperial rivalry ended with the death of
both empires after World War I. Newly founded Soviet Union was the first European power
to recognise the Ankara Government during the War of liberation in 1921. The unique
Turkish-Russian political alliance lived short, because of the deaths of their leaders, and
hostility renewed with Stalin's territorial claims to Eastern Turkey and joint control over the
Straits after World War II. In response to increasing Soviet pressure, after a process began
from 1939 onwards, Turkey eventually chose to join a formal alliance with the West in 1952,
starting a period which the two countries remained within separate adversary ideological and
military systems throughout the Cold War.
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive account on Turkish-Russian relations and conflict throughout history see, Akdes Nimet
Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya: XVII.Yüzyıl sonundan Kurtuluş Savaşına kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri, Ankara
Üniversitesi, Ankara, 1970.
2This work, aims to update the struggle over Eurasia by shedding light over the post-
Soviet space, Russia and Turkey as the main historical and contemporary rivals in the region,
their foreign policy transformations, policies toward the region and each other, and present a
framework that would help to have an insight on the possible and probable developments in
the future of this part of the globe. Main concern is to assess the change in the balances
between Turkey and Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To this end, regional
and global actors, processes and events will also be evaluated throughout the research.
 In the first part of the thesis, the new Russian State’s foreign policy construction and
transformation will be analysed. The phases which Russian foreign policy evolved through
and basic priorities and tasks of it will be identified. The second part will concentrate on the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which became the main focus of the Russian
Federation and its regional/global strategy, and analyse Moscow’s policies towards the region
through the decade. The final and main chapter will elaborate on the Turkish foreign policy
transformation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its formulation and conduct over the
post-USSR space, and Turkish relations with the Russian Federation, Caucasian and Central
Asian states. Intersecting points of Turkish and Russian spheres of influence, major areas of
contention and co-operation will be identified and evaluated, by implementing a
historical/issue based methodology within the constraints of the theoretical framework of the
discipline of international relations.
3Chapter I:
THE BEAR’S AWAKE:
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
 2.1. Foreign Policy before the Independence
The foreign policy formulation and conduct of the USSR was a complex process of
co-ordination between the party and state institutions which are complementary in nature. The
main actor in policymaking and conduct was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), while this power in the West is concentrated in the foreign ministries.1 The Party had
the final and determinant word on the foreign policy moves and diplomatic activities as the
article 6 of the constitution of the USSR orders.2 
The Party applied control over the foreign policy through the Politburo and the
Secretariat3. However, since most of the members of these bodies were not qualified as
foreign policy experts, the decisions were taken by a smaller group of members including the
general secretary and the “power ministries”.4 Certain agencies such as the Ministry of
Defence, which had a narrow definition of national security on military terms, and Central
Committee’s International Department, which is mostly concerned with the “zero sum game”,
were as (or sometimes, more) influential as the foreign ministry on the orientation of policy.
 The main aim of the foreign policy, its making and conduct was to safeguard the
USSR, the “socialist island in the capitalist sea”, and to work for the triumph of Communism
nationally and globally.  The “internationalist” foreign policy aimed enhancing security and
international influence of the Union. Until Mikhail Gorbachov, the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, by
                                                          
1 N. N. Petro and A. Z. Rubinstein, Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State, Addison Wesley
Longman, New York, 1997, pp. 92-93.
2 1977 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, Novosti Press Agency
Publishing House, Moscow, 1985, Article 6.
3 The Politburo (Political Bureau) was a committee of supreme administrational power, with roughly 20
members, including the General Secretary of the CPSU, the premier, the first deputy premier, foreign, defence
and KGB ministers, and various other government officials such as the heads of republic parties. The Secretariat,
which headed the administrative branch of the CPSU, was a smaller size body with many members overlapping
with the Politburo. The Politburo was nominally subordinate to the Central Committee, however, since Stalin, it
has the real power.
4which the USSR committed to “defend the common gains of socialism”, was the rule of
conduct of foreign policy, which served as a pretext for interventions abroad such as the
Warsaw Pact Organisation invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The main concern of the
foreign policy of the USSR was the “World Revolution”.
Gorbachov and his “new thinking” (novoe myshlenie) separated from the traditional
ways of the Soviet conduct on foreign affairs breaking the zero-sum game view of the world
associated with the Marxist theory.5 With the relative freedom of speech he brought with his
reforms, most of the taboos and cults of the Soviet ideology opened to criticism as well as the
internal and external policies of the administration. “Internationalist” interventions in the
Eastern Europe recalled with resentment and contemporary interventions in Afghanistan and
various other third world countries began to be the foci of incrementing criticism. Attempts to
question the official ideology, to reinterpret Marxism-Leninism, and conceptualising the new
notion of “humanitarian internationalism” to replace the communist internationalism shaped
the period of Gorbachov6. The “new thinking”, posited the importance of common security in
an international system with a number of nuclear powers and placed reduced emphasis on
military power as a guarantor of security.7 It had idealistically outlined an agenda for
international affairs, in which wider global concerns are placed above the realistically defined
“national interests” of the states.
Gorbachov’s efforts were concentrated on enhancing security rather than enhancing
influence, and finally he sacrificed the latter for the sake of the former. Military, technical and
economic support to the pro-Soviet third world countries around the globe were cut and
withdrawal of Red Army troops from Afghanistan (1988) and Eastern Europe (1989) began.
According to the new thinking, the use and maintenance of “military power, geopolitical
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Petro and Rubinstein, p. 93.
5 Amin Saikal and William Maley, “From Soviet to Russian Foreign Policy”, in Amin Saikal, ed. Russia in
Search of its Future, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.104.
6 Petro and Rubinstein, p. 96.
5expansionism and empire building are outdated forms of international conduct”.8 His new
foreign minister Shevardnadze, parallel to Gorbachov’s reorganisation efforts of the party
apparatus, started restructuring the foreign ministry, replacing all of the deputy ministers and
three of four senior officials, creating new departments, changing the status of old ones and
undercutting the power of the ministry bureaucracy.9
The struggle to tighten the grip of the foreign policy mechanism of the Gorbachov-
Shevardnadze duo repeated in the process of RSFSR’s independence under Boris Yeltsin and
Andrey Kozyrev. In the years of turmoil, Yeltsin, in search for more power in internal and
external politics independent from the Union, sought to build the republic’s own institutions,
among them the foreign ministry of Russia. Kozyrev, a former Union diplomat, became his
accompany on the major task of shaping Russia’s foreign affairs.
2.2. After The Soviet Union: Yeltsin-Kozyrev Era
During the years of transition from a Union republic to an independent member of the
world community, Russia was a scene of restructuring old and creating new state institutions
with a head-spinning pace, together with a painstaking effort to keep the state apparatus
operational. This difficult task could only be accomplished by a highly qualified and aspiring
team of technocrats. The new generation of administrators Yeltsin appointed for the
transformation of the country in the period of 1990-1991 were called as the ‘Young Turks’ or
‘mladoturki’; a wide range of able bureaucrats in their thirties and forties.10
In December 1991, one of the most important milestones of the post-Soviet (almost)
Russian history; the agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus creating the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was signed in Belovezhskaya Pushcha near
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 Amin Saikal and William Maley, “From Soviet to Russian...”, p.104.
8 Hannes Adomeit, “Russia as a ‘Great Power’ in World Affairs: Images and Reality”, International Affairs
(RIIA), vol. 71, no. 1, January 1995, p.42.
9 Petro and Rubinstein, pp. 97-98.
6Minsk. This agreement meant the de jure dissolution of the USSR, which was already a
defunct entity. Having been initialised by only the three westernmost members of the Union,
the initiative’s consequences on internal and external policies were not really recognised at
that time. The most important short-term target of Yeltsin and his counterparts in the other
signatory states was to displace the political authority from the Union president Gorbachov.11
The CIS expanded quickly to all of the former union republics (except the Baltics),
broadening the scope and problems of the foreign policy makers, and initialising the euphoric
debate between the “Atlanticists” and the “Eurasianists”.12
2.2.1. In Search for a National Interest: Main Tasks of Foreign Policy
The initial years of independence is a period of bitter search for a consistent and
coherent foreign policy directed to a new ‘national interest’. With the end of the half century
long superpower confrontation, Russia, the largest and strongest heir to the USSR, is no
longer a ‘superpower’ in the traditional meaning of the word, undressed of its global political
influence and ambitions, lost most of the allies in Europe, and weakened militarily despite its
large thermonuclear and conventional arsenal. Cold War grand strategy of confrontation until
the triumph of World Revolution must be replaced with a new, more humble goal. The
emphasis would no longer be on the “class interests” but on “national interests”.  Immediately
before and after the demise of the union, RSFSR was, like most of the other republics, in the
limbo with its crippled economy and ruined social system. The vacuum of political
administration created by the disappearance of the Union institutions13, brought struggles
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 A more detailed account on the ‘Young Turks’ will be given below.
11 Petro and Rubinstein, p. 99.
12 Many authors use different terms for these two camps; The ‘Atlanticists’ are frequently named as the
‘Westerners’ or  ‘Westernisers’, while the ‘Eurasianists’ are called ‘Eurasians’ or  ‘Slavophiles’. Since the names
Westerner, Westerniser or Slavophile can be easily confused with the sides of the late 19th  century philosophical
debate among the Russian intelligentsia, the terms Atlanticist and Eurasianist will be used throughout this work.
13 It is important to note that Russia, unlike the remaining 14 republics of former Soviet Union, did not have its
own national state structure and institutions at the time of dissolution, therefore extra effort was needed to re-
operate the policy making and implementation mechanisms.
7between interest groups and camps of intelligentsia that shaped the first several years of the
search for the new national interest.
Two main tasks of Russian foreign policy were, as stated by President  Yeltsin; “to
secure Russia's entry into the civilised [world] community, and to enlist maximum support for
efforts toward Russia's transformation”14. Foreign Minister Kozyrev added a third task; to
develop good relations with Russia's new neighbours, the former republics of the Soviet
Empire.15 To salvage its crippled economy, Russia needed a rapid and healthy transformation
of its system, particularly the economic structures. To do so, Western economic know-how
and material aid was needed, and securing that help was the immediate task of Russian
foreign policy.
In the search for the new national interest for the Russian State, the president and his
team had to accept the new geopolitical status the country left with, and formulate strategies
according to this new ecosystem. The relation of Russia with the rest of the world (can be
read as the ‘West’ of the world) started as a ‘romantic euphoria’16, which had faded by the
gradual realisation of the geopolitical realities and settlement of balances in the region. The
end of this early romantic period also signalled the commencement of a new debate over what
should constitute the national interest of new Russia; between the “Atlanticists”, who argued
that Russia should approach to the West further for salvation; and the “Eurasianists”, who
were against closer relationship with and “dependence” to the West, emphasising the distinct
“Russian character and mission” of state.17
                                                          
14 Russian TV, 13 February, 1992, 10:00 am, as cited in Suzanne Crow, "Russian Federation Faces Foreign
Policy Dilemmas", RFE/RL Russian Report, 6 March 1992, p. 15.
15 Interfax, 25 February 1992
16 Petro and Rubinstein, p. 99.
17 This debate was basically concerned with the foreign affairs, but in fact a more integral and general question
of the future character of the Russian state and nation was the core of the argument. In many ways it resembled
the 19th century debate between the Zapadniki (Westerners) and Slavyanofili (Slavophiles) among the members
of the highly active Russian intelligentsia on the “cultural identity” of the country, and the concept of
Yevraziystvo (Eurasianness) re-emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, when Russian émigrés in Europe tried to find a
compromise with the Stalinist version of Socialism. These inter-war Eurasianists published a collection of essays
entitled “Exit to the East” (Iskhod k vostoku), through which they strongly opposed Western-style democracy,
82.2.2. The Atlanticists versus the Eurasianists 18
In 1991, Yeltsin replaced the higher bureaucrats of the old Party apparat with a group
of relatively young politicians, who were called as the “Young Turks”. Besides the new
deputy chairman of the RSFSR government, Gennadiy Burbulis, the group was including the
well-known  economist Yegor Gaydar, who was in charge of introducing market economy to
Russia. Interesting part is that the most prominent representatives of the camps, which will
later be labelled as Atlanticists and Eurasianists; foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev and state
advisor, Sergey Stankevich were also among the names linked with the mladoturki.19 Their
common goal then was separating the paths of the drowning USSR and the newly born
RSFSR, replacing the communist system with liberal market economy and a Western style
democracy, but they also sought to inherit the superpower status of the USSR, arguing that a
democratic superpower in Eurasia would strengthen security regionally and globally.20
In the international arena, their aim was to retain the status of the former Union as a
world power and to keep the seat in the UN Security Council, arguing that the RSFSR is the
main heir of the USSR. Keeping the international esteem (and self-esteem) became one of the
most important issues of the Russian foreign policy from then on. As the Speaker of the
Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Hasbulatov stated: "a major task of Russia's foreign policy and
diplomacy is to contribute to the efforts to create ... [a] place commanding respect in the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
promoted an authoritarian form of rule that consult the vox populi. They believed that Russians are inherently
incapable of participating in Western culture. These Eurasianists also considered the word “Russia” was a
misnomer for the historical and cultural entity it designated. Instead, they argued, Russia should be termed
“Eurasia” (Yevraziya) since it is a compound of Slavic, Turkish, Iranian, Christian, Muslim, etc components.
18 It must be remembered that the political spectrum in Russia was and is too complicated to allow a simple
division into two distinct clear-cut camps. Many analysts make more complicated lists of political affiliations,
however, taking the basic attitudes towards world politics into account, the terms Atlanticist and Eurasianist can
share almost all of the political spectrum in Russia.  For different categorisations of the Russian schools of
thought in foreign policy, see Alexei Arbatov, “Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition,” in Baranovsky,
Vladimir, ed., Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997,
pp. 135-159; Alexander A. Sergounin, “Russian Post-Communist Foreign Policy Thinking in the Cross-roads:
Changing Paradigms”, Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 2000.
19 See Alexander Rahr, “Russia’s Young Turks’ in Power”, Report on the USSR, no 47, 1991, p.20.
20 Ibid, p.20.
9world community".21 The foreign minister confirmed this task and elaborated the new Russian
notion of “great power” (velikaya derzhava22);
“No doubt Russia will not cease to be a great power. But it will be abnormal great
power. Its national interests will be a priority.  But these will be interests
understandable to democratic countries, and Russia will be defending them through
interaction with partners, not through confrontation ..... The new openness also
presupposes a fundamental change in Russia’s attitude towards the United States, the
West and NATO. Russia does not wish to bear any unnatural military responsibility
beyond its borders. The time of world policemen is over, as is the era of military
confrontation.”23
Another important aspect of the mladoturetskiy foreign policy ideas is that they were
not in favour of altering the borders between the Union republics and not interested in defence
of the Russians abroad; mainly in the Ukraine (the Crimea) and Kazakstan. This argument
was based on the premise that the Russian-origin minorities in the former-Soviet republics are
large enough to defend their own rights and existence, but the main motive was to eliminate
the danger of disintegration of the RSFSR itself, by legitimising the federation’s borders.24
What Yeltsin envisioned at the beginning of the transition period was a new Russia,
based on democratic institutions and the rule of law, integrated to the future common political
system of industrial countries in the northern hemisphere25. To this end, he enlisted
bureaucrats and diplomats most of which fall into the definition of an Atlanticist, and
implemented pro-Western, politically westernising policies immediately. These diplomats led
by Kozyrev dominated the foreign policy making processes in the first couple of years of
independence. The Atlanticists can be described as democratic-minded diplomats whose ideas
were shaped under the influence of Gorbachov's “common European home” and the "new
                                                          
21 Interfax, 26 February 1992
22 The Russian word for “state” that means the whole of the institutions through which the political power is
exercised is gosudarstvo. The word derzhava also has the meaning of “state”, but denotes its nature as an actor in
the international politics. When a Russian leader speaks about his state being a great power, he would most
likely use the word derzhava.
23 Andrei Kozyrev, “Russia: A Chance for Survival”, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 10,13
24 see Alexander Rahr, “Russia’s Young Turks’...”, p.23
25 Alexander Rahr, "Atlanticists versus Eurasians in Russian Foreign Policy", RFE/RL Russian Report, 29 May
1992, vol 1, no 22, p 17.
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thinking"26. Most of these diplomats were positioned in influential posts in the ministry by
Shevardnadze, during his restructuring operation parallel to Gorbachov’s.
The official line of Atlanticist foreign policy envisioned a quick incorporation into the
Western world. They sought to join in most of the Western organisations, economic or
political, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), G-7, and even NATO27. For the ruling élite,
international economic organisations and platforms were crucial for the salvation of the
system in Russia, which is on the brink of a social eruption. They believed that, with the huge
industrial complex, developed infrastructure, well-trained manpower and huge potential of
raw materials, Russia deserved to be inside the club of developed/industrialised countries, the
G-728. Kozyrev called for a two-stage transformation of G-7 into a G-8, commencing with
closer co-operation in political issues and finalising with the integration of Russia into the
world economy.29
The Eurasianists were rather discontent with the fully western oriented Russian
foreign policy under Kozyrev and Yeltsin. They believed that Russia should not abandon the
South, because of its strong historical and cultural ties and a “specific role as a mediator”
between civilisations.30
                                                          
26 Ibid., p 17.
27 For statements of high ranking Russian officials on membership to NATO, see Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, no.
1, 15 January 1992, p.13, Hannes Adomeit, “The Atlantic Alliance in Soviet and Russian Perspective”, in Neil
Malcolm, ed., Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation?, RIIA, London, 1994, pp.31-54.
28 Like Turkey putting membership to the European Union in the centre of its foreign policy and taking it as a
principal measure of international success, and China seeking membership to WTO with a similar motive, Russia
put great importance on the issue of accession to the G-7. Being the eight country in the club would mean
international recognition of Russian claims to be a great power in the “new multipolar order”. Although Yeltsin
and, after him Putin have gradually been granted a status close to full membership, Russia’s role has still had
symbolic significance. The old seven continue to meet separately to discuss economic issues on which Russia
lacks the standing for an equal role. Thus, Russia’s participation in the G-8 remains largely decorative. For a
more detailed account on Russia and the G-8, see Stephen Sestanovich, “Where does Russia Belong?”, The
National Interest, no.1, Winter 2000, pp. 6-7.
29 Andrei Kozyrev, “The Lagging Partnership”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1994, vol. 73, no. 3, p. 65.
30 Alexander Rahr, "Atlanticists versus Eurasians...”, p. 17.
11
“Russia’s role in the world is ... to initiate and maintain a multilateral dialogue
between cultures, civilisations and states. It is Russia which reconciles, unites and co-
ordinates... This land in which East and West, North and South are united, is unique,
and is perhaps the only one capable of harmoniously uniting many different voices in a
historical symphony.31
The Eurasianists argued that the new national interest must be defined according to the
indigenous traditions and character of Russian State and Nation, not as simply adapting
Western practices. They believed that Russia represented a distinctive third civilisation
between the West and the East, Europe and Asia proper for ages, with its cosmopolite
composition of peoples, vast territory stretching from Europe to the Pacific and its integrative
perspective on world politics created by its history of frequent interaction with most distant
corners of the planet. If this mediating role was abandoned, Russia would only be a secondary
regional power doomed to left out of major international affairs.
Sergey Stankevich, political advisor of the president, was one of the most well-known
outspokenly-Eurasianist politicians. In early 1990s he was viewed as the most important
figure of the so-called Eurasianist lobby, and a possible replacement for the foreign minister,
in case the balances shift away from the Atlanticist side. He was a harsh critic of Kozyrev
directly and Yeltsin indirectly, arguing that the post-Soviet policy was nothing but a simple
strategy to join the Group of Seven32. According to Stankevich Russia must reorient its
diplomatic efforts to re-establish relations with the Muslim world in general, and the ex-
Soviet Turkic states in particular, without alienating the Western world. Since Russia did not
have the material capability to compete with the industrialised West, closer economic co-
operation and increase in trade relations with the developing countries should be sought in the
first phase of a catch-up strategy33.
Despite of the pressure it created over the Atlanticists, the Eurasianist opposition also
had uses in relations with the West for Kozyrev and his adherents. The existence of the
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32 Ibid.
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Eurasianist camp, which can be easily linked with the neo-imperialist tendencies of the
communists and the ultra-nationalists, helped Kozyrev and his team for extortion of foreign
aid from the West, by repeating the dangers of letting down the reformers in Russia. They
frequently emphasised that their alternative is a ultra-nationalistic hard-liner administration
which would probably return to authoritarian rule and isolate Russia again from the World.
2.2.3. Towards a Consensus: Change in Russian Foreign Policy
President Yeltsin’s stance was much closer to the Atlanticists in the initial years. He
strongly believed that the most important priorities of the new Russian state were the Western
style democracy and free market economy. Yeltsin and his administration also felt the
necessity to emphasise that Russia is no longer an imperialistic power. In practice, Russia
decreased its diplomatic activity in the former USSR republics to the lowest level, and
withdrew its troops from many hot areas (e.g. Mountainous Karabağ, the Baltics).
In August 1992, Kozyrev had stated that his critics with a "besieged-fortress mentality
and the psychology of mistrust of the US, of other western countries, and of other democratic
states" would turn Russia back into the imperial state it used to be, which would threaten the
others, especially its neighbours.34 A transformation towards this direction, according to
Kozyrev, would lead to a dead-end, which is isolation in international affairs.35 The fear of a
neo-imperial take-over of power in Russia is voiced again in front of foreign diplomats in his
speech in a session of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Stockholm in 14 December 1992.36 However, under
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strong opposition from different segments and strata of the society and political élite, Russian
foreign policy became cruder and more aggressive within a couple of years. Yeltsin had to
make concessions to the adversaries of his policies, and this process gradually moved the
weight towards the Eurasianist doctrine. Kozyrev too, had to choose to obediently follow the
line of evolution of the president instead of confronting it openly, since the president was his
only pillar of support in all power structures.37 The reached common ground for the two
competing visions of foreign policy direction was symbolised with the legislation of the
important document of ‘Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’ in Spring
1993.38 This document illustrated how much the Russian foreign policy turned inward, even
isolationist, in its new definition of the fundamental national interests.39 The Foreign Policy
Concept was followed by another important document in Autumn 1993, the “Military
Doctrine of the Russian Federation”40 which defined the role of the Russian Military with
respect to the foreign and security policies of the Federation.
The three main reasons for the change in the attitude of the foreign policy makers
were; the challenge of Russian Nationalism, the rejection of the role of junior partner to the
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West; and the influence of the military.41 Although this list brings the risk of
oversimplification of the processes leading to the transformation of the foreign policy, it
successfully singles out the main reason as the superpower complex of the pride-broken
Russians. Besides these domestic causes, some events on the international arena facilitated the
consensus in foreign policy, such as the Atlanticists’ disappointment of the Western
powerlessness in stopping the war in the Balkans, and the increasing ethnic and political
tensions in the post-Soviet space; especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the turn of
1992, most of the members of the Atlanticist camp were frustrated with the reality that Russia
failed to quickly transform into a western-style great power with a salvaged economy.42
The role of the influential military establishment and arms industry in the change of
foreign policy direction cannot be denied. Especially after the demise of the Union, Russia
was left with its weak and low-tech industry, which was no match for western competition.
The Russian market was easily and quickly invaded by western consumer products and the
Russian goods were swept away. The only branch of industry which stand a chance against
world brands was the arms industry, with the enormous legacy of the military-industrial
complex of the USSR. Russia should sell weapons to cover the expenditures, and the primary
role was assumed by newly established weapon import-export monopoly Rosvooruzhenie43
on this task. Rosvooruzhenie had the advantage of being the monopoly on military vehicles
and weapons in the armies of the members of the Warsaw Pact, most of which still depended
on these systems. A more assertive foreign policy towards the ex-socialist states and former
Union republics would supply Russian industry with greater number of clients and deal
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possibilities, with increasing need for security measures within the country and in the borders
of the CIS countries. Therefore, the support of the military and the civilian élite is crucial for
the fate of the leadership and its policies, especially concerning foreign affairs. The durability
of the Russian foreign policy depended on the durability of the consensus between the
diplomats, the politicians and the soldiers.44 This kind of a consensus was created during
1993, with the formulation of the Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine,
indicating the adequate level of harmonisation of these groups' interests.
Among the above listed possible causes of the direction change, Western treatment of
Russia as inferior is quite important, at least because of its influence on the rhetoric of the
leadership who was still uneasy of its shaky grip on power. In Early 1994, Yeltsin was talking
about Western discrimination against Russia and attempts to force Russia into the role of
junior partner in international affairs.45 Russian foreign ministry’s reaction to the Western
military intervention in the Bosnian War was clearly reflected this sense of humiliation:
“Moscow will not accept being informed on decisions to utilise force in ex-Yugoslavia as a
fait accompli. Russia is not a banana republic but a permanent member of the UN Security
Council.”46 During a visit to India, one of the most important Eastern would-be-allies and
would-be trade-partners in the Eurasianists’ shortlist, he also told that Russia is "moving away
from Western emphasis" in diplomacy.47
With this bent in the direction of the foreign policy, Yeltsin and Kozyrev found
themselves speaking with the tone of their hard-line opponents of a couple of years ago.48 The
share of relations with the former allies and Union republics grew in their speeches, the
concern about the Russians and Russian-speaking minorities abroad started to be voiced
louder and diplomatic activity in the CIS intensified. In the messages to the West, the pretext
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was to prevent the neo-imperialist forces from exploiting the social discontent about the
alleged bad treatment of Russians in the NIS and the Western indifference to the heavy
economic conditions the country is in. “Russia and the Russian people sense that Russia
needed a more independent and assertive foreign policy”, Kozyrev argued, if the “democrats”
(read “Atlanticists/Westerners” or simply, “us”) fail to secure Western recognition of
Russia’s status and significance as a world power, and treatment as an equal, they would “be
swept away by a wave of aggressive nationalism” which is exploiting this need for national
and state self-assertion.49
Today Russia faces a historic choice – either proceed with the difficult task of
continuing reforms or face the danger of slipping into one or another form of
extremism. And it is now that Russia needs to be sure that the world needs it as a
strong member in the family of free, law-based, democratic states and not as a “sick
man” of Europe and Asia. Supportive policies are the best investments for the West,
but they cannot be motivated by paternalism or an assumed inequality. Russia is
predestined to be a great power. It remained as such for centuries in spite of repeated
internal upheavals. What matters now is whether it is resurrected as a hostile nation
under nationalist rule or as a peaceful and democratic one.50 (italics added)
The change in the foreign policy welcomed by many critics of Kozyrev and his line of
policy. Increasing number of frustrated officials and politicians, most of whom are ex-Soviet
officials, were joining the audience applauding for the change and looking for more
concessions in order to see the “empire” up and running again. This change of tide against the
Atlanticists meant the rise of the derzhavniki or gosudarstvenniki (proponents of state power),
who were in favour of maximisation of the power of the state regardless of the arguments
over cultural identity or foreign policy orientation.51
The growing support for the ultra-nationalist movements like Zhirinovskiy’s and
communists under Zyuganov, who became much alike in their rhetoric52, and the increasing
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influence of the hard-liner rhetoric on the actual conduct of foreign policy alerted many
Russians as well as foreigners. Increasing suspicion of the revival of the USSR in any form
alerted the Western leaders and their counterparts in the periphery of the Russian Federation,
who are haunted by the memories of the Soviet past and the Cold War.
Among several events which qualify as possible reasons of the policy transformation,
the unexpectedly high popular support for the “patriotic” parties (particularly the Liberal
Democrat Party of Russia (LDPR) of the ultra-nationalist Zhirinovskiy) in the elections of 12
December 1993 is outstanding.53 In the West, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his extreme
nationalist rhetoric became the symbol of the danger of return of imperialism in Russia, and
scenarios of revival of the Soviet Union brought into argument again.54 He spoke about
restoring Russia to the imperial frontiers of 1900, which included Poland and Finland, and a
rapid expansion southward until the Russian soldiers “wash their boots in the warm waters of
the Indian Ocean.”55 In fact, besides his temporarily high support and charismatic character
fitting in the strong leader image of Russians, Zhirinovskiy was highly overestimated in the
West as a political figure and a future leader, partly because of its extraordinary style and
attention-grabbing performance. The new democracy in Russia proved to be strong and stable
enough to keep extremists away from power so far.  Zhirinovskiy and LDPR marginalised in
the legislative bodies and reduced to a mere spoilsport.
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   Actually, Zhirinovskiy's perception in the West was a handy tool for the 'liberal'
Russian politicians to preserve their 'dove' image and to display what would happen if Russia
would be isolated from the world.56. Yeltsin administration frequently used this card against
unfavourable acts of the Western powers, such as the NATO enlargement proposal. In an
interview with a American newspaper, Kozyrev stated that this enlargement will strengthen
Zhirinovskiy.57 The ‘liberals and democrats’ in power kept taking advantage of the
misleadingly named58 Liberal Democrat Party of Zhirinovskiy as a scarecrow or a scapegoat
in masking the frequent hawkish conduct of Russian foreign policy in the region.  He could
also serve as a safety gauge for the ultra-nationalistic tendencies in the country, since the
movement’s leader “with its rash, outlandish statements to the press, [is] a self-destructive
clown”59 who keeps popular support to his party below the possible level.60
In the West, there was a strong tendency to view Russia as a defeated superpower that
must go through a period of reflection and redemption as Germany and Japan did after the
World War II.61 Being aware of this and the fragile nature of the Russian restructuring process
and ramshackle political system, the Westerners tried to act as careful as possible in matters
related to Russia. The formulation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative instead of a
crude NATO enlargement is a vivid example for this cautious attitude. Another example was
displayed during the insurgency in Moldova when the initially indecisive Russian
government's interference in the crisis was encouraged by the western silence.62 Scholar
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Dimitri Simes, foresaw the US attitude concerning the expected "stabilising role" of RF in the
former USSR territory as turning a blind eye at worst, or tacit approval at best.63 The passing
years proved the accuracy of this prediction especially for the case of Central Asia and to a
lesser extent for the Caucasus.  This careful approach of the west, particularly the US evolved
into a more hawkish one, as the assertiveness of Russian foreign policy increased through
years. Tensions over nuclear issues, Russian relations with technology transfer to Iran and
India, rivalry in the Caucasus over Caspian oil and arms sales to China increased the contempt
between the two states. The relation between the US and the Russian Federation can be
described as a love and hate relationship64, which started as a passionate love (1991-1992) and
turned into hatred in 1993. Ambassador Lukin, to explain this tidal behaviour of US policy
towards Russia, summarised the Americans' dual image of the Russian Federation as "the
Cold War rival" and "America's democratic junior partner".65
2.3. Maturity in Foreign Policy
The phase of institutionalisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was mostly
completed under Kozyrev’s administration.66 Besides the transfer of the diplomatic authority
from the late USSR to the new Russian State, the restructuring of the ministry was also
accomplished with a dazzling speed. Older generation Soviet diplomats and ones with
communist tendencies were removed and replaced by new minister’s generation of younger
diplomats who are already experienced in various important levels of the ministry.
Institution’s hierarchical and organisational structure was also altered, abolishing the old
departmental system and introducing new departments, smaller in number but adequate in
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covering the international issues efficiently.67   This restructuring operation was crucial for the
separation of “Russian” foreign policy mechanism from that of the Soviet Union, and it
brought the needed fresh blood to the ministry itself, however, in the short-run, dramatically
downsized its ability to formulate and conduct an effective foreign policy. The violent
decentralisation of the foreign policy making mechanism with the dissolution of the USSR led
to a short period of anarchy and loose co-ordination between agencies brought a reactionary
act of recentralisation in 1993. In the long-term, this tidal movement helped the creation of a
relatively stable and effective decentralised mechanism.
The change in the balances in Russian domestic policy forced president Yeltsin to sack
Kozyrev who, according to the president, failed to ensure “dignity, predictability and
reliability”68 in foreign policy, to strengthen his position for the presidential election in June
1996 against his opponents who were highly critical of the administration’s pro-western
policies. On 9 January 1996, the head of Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Yevgeniy
Primakov was appointed as the new foreign minister. He was an expert on the Middle Eastern
affairs, who served as the director of the prestigious Soviet think tank; the Institute for
International Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) which had an important role in
formulating Gorbachov’s “new thinking” in foreign policy.69
Primakov immediately publicised the new official direction of the foreign ministry in
his first press conference as minister. His top four priorities were; fostering external
conditions that strengthen the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, encouraging
peaceful integrative processes among the members of the CIS, stabilising regional conflicts in
the CIS and former Yugoslavia, and finally, preventing the spread of weapons of mass
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destruction.70 The new priorities declared by Primakov clearly illustrated the shift of Russian
foreign policy away from the West and toward the “Near Abroad”. Immediately after the
settlement of the changes in the ministry, he set off for a tour of CIS states, and launched a
mission of shuttle diplomacy between Yerevan and Baku in search for a solution to the
Karabağ conflict. Although seemed to be more assertive then his predecessor, in fact,
Primakov was merely continuing the process of further integration of the CIS “around and
under” Russia which had already started under Kozyrev.
Under Primakov, Russian foreign policy, leaving behind the “liberal internationalism”
aimed at the country’s fastest possible integration into the Western community, “appeared to
become rooted in more down-to-earth national self-interest aimed at regaining an important
position in the world”.71  This phase of foreign policy occasionally has led to disagreements
and even friction with the West, especially with the US. Primakov followed a more anti-
American – but not anti-Western – line, calling for multipolarity in international politics72. In
a couple of years, with the observable change to better in the ministry’s performance and his
“rejection of vulgar pro-Americanism”, Primakov garnered more support from intellectuals
and politicians.73 Although his tone resembled old Soviet imperial style occasionally, he
refrained from a shift towards isolation or confrontation with the US. He preferred
equidistance to all major foci of power on the globe and flexibility in overall foreign policy.
Primakov brought his style to the ministry. His credentials as a pragmatic, experienced
and respected Soviet-style diplomat74, put him above immediate criticism of the nationalists
and communists, and his pragmatic character made him “a more solid centre of gravity in the
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foreign policy élite.”75 This wide range support gave him a larger area of manoeuvre than
Kozyrev, who occasionally had to make verbal and actual concessions to the “patriotic”
opposition to buy room for his westward policies. According to Russian analyst Trenin; “both
inside and outside Russia, whereas Kozyrev may have been liked without being respected,
Primakov is more often respected than liked. Where Kozyrev would talk softly but fail to
deliver, Primakov will speak gruffly but reach agreements that stick.”76
His most important achievement concerning the foreign policy of Russia, is to take it
out of the influence of domestic politics. He got “foreign help” in achieving this, in the form
of international issues around the borders of the Federation, such as the eastward expansion of
NATO, and wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, which led to a domestic consensus in the country.
This consensus can be singled out as the most important cause of the extinguishing of the
Atlanticist-Eurasianist debate in the political circles. Primakov’s pragmatic conduct
symbolised the synthesis of the clashing views of the debaters. National, not international,
security became the matter of primary concern again, and “realism” has returned as the main
theoretical framework for Russian foreign policy making.77 With stronger emphasis on multi-
faceted co-operation with all countries, “a moderate version of Eurasianism was tacitly
accepted by the Russian foreign policy élites.”78
The “National Security Concepts” of 1997 and 2000 and the “Military Doctrine” of
2000 also signify the latest Russian foreign policy orientations and change in the Russian
perception of the international politics and views on security of the country. The 1997
document basically focused on the place of Russia in the world, defined Russia’s national
interests, identified threats to its national security, and singled out the ways of ensuring
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security. The document had a relatively optimistic content, with the economic situation and
the process of incorporation into the western world were proceeding with adequate speed, and
security around the Federation seemed ensured. It did not identify any external “enemies”
which could be a direct threat to the national security79 and stated that the most important
threats to Russian security lay not in the international system but in Russia’s internal
conditions..80 The 2000 document appeared to be a copy of the 1997 version with a set of
important amendments reflecting the experiences and conclusions of the passed two years.81
This version was rather pessimistic in comparison to the former because of the “deterioration
of the inter-communal and international relations”. The internal and external changes that
caused this change were mainly, the NATO enlargement which was interpreted by the
Russian leadership as a geopolitical setback; the 1998 economic crisis revealing the weakness
of the Russian economy; NATO intervention in Kosovo, which was not only interpreted as an
unjustified assault on an historical ally, but also as a sign of a new world order in which the
traditional idea of sovereignty could be suppressed in defence of human rights; and Russian
armed intervention in Chechnya, which directly resulted in the restoration of  confidence in
the use of force as a means of solution of political problems82. Besides all above, one of the
most important factor of the change was the change of leadership in the Russian Federation;
the seemingly unchecked ascendance of a former KGB agent , Vladimir Putin, first to prime
ministry and then to presidency.
Following the institutionalisation process of the Russian foreign policy leading to a
clear consensus around its the priorities, implementation and order of national interests under
Primakov and later Igor’ Ivanov in the period of 1994-1997, Yeltsin regime “had developed a
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synthesis that still emphasised co-operation and integration with the West, but also
incorporated a strong measure of Russian Eurasianism and great power thinking, rooting the
policy in a more traditional cast.”83 The government included strong names of Soviet tradition
such as Chernomyrdin and Primakov, who could implement the policies that made this
synthesis possible, but the 1998 economic crisis and the Kosovo intervention in 1999, brought
instability in the Russian political stage again. Yeltsin changed the name plaque on the prime
minister’s door five times in this period, finally handing the post over Putin, the head of the
Federal Security Service (FSB) in August 1999. Putin, unlike his predecessors, successfully
moved out of Yeltsin’s shadow, gaining the domestic credit for his assertive policies. Putin,
heavily influenced by the agenda of former foreign and prime minister Primakov, who
advocated creation of a multipolar world in which the USA’s status and power decline, used
arms sales and energy exports to expand Russia’s spheres of influence.84 He is perceived as a
Soviet style leader, who has already identified his goal as restoration of a powerful Russian
state instead of democratic reform85.
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Chapter II:
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK:
RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE CIS
3.1. The Birth of a New Eurasia
When Gorbachov called into question the very need for the Party guidance, which
justified the Union’s policy decisions since Lenin, none of the republics had a clear idea of
what should be the direction of the policies in the new era. It seemed that few of them agreed
on the need for a single, overarching definition of the new national interest.1 The first
movements of separate foreign and domestic policy agenda came from the Baltic states well
before the actual break up of the Union, which were followed by Armenian and Georgian
secessionist movements because of the raising pressure of Moscow in the region2. Following
the Baltics and the Southern Caucasus, Russia (RSFSR) itself was on the course of building
and strengthening its national sovereignty, with calculated moves in domestic and foreign
policy to duplicate the Union’s and to legitimise the Russian national government as an
international actor. Eventually, the USSR was dissolved legally by the end of 1991 and left 15
newly independent states (NIS) behind on the former Soviet territory.
The Commonwealth of Independent States was founded by the three Slavic countries
of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus with an agreement signed in Belovezhskaya Pushcha in
December 1991, and joined by the remaining former Soviet republics except the Baltics and
Georgia in the same two weeks later by the Almaty Declaration. Its initial aim of facilitating
economic and political transformation of the NIS evolved into a instrument of Moscow to
rebuild its security and political influence, a process which was facilitated by the power
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imbalance between Russia and the other members, and the Soviet legacy of Moscow-centred
economic inter-dependency.
3.1.1. CIS as the Focal Point of Russian Foreign Policy
Russia did not loose much time in realising that the territory of the former Soviet
empire is crucial for the security and economic well-being of the new national state. To be a
great power, you should at least be regional power, and Russia must preserve its privileged
position in the Eurasian geopolitical space through one way or another. After all, Russia,
having a deliberately planned and constructed central position in the communist economy,
with its developed infrastructure directly linking it to all of the former Union republics who
have little or no means to interact among themselves, is the best option for leadership in
collaboration for restructuring. Its unique geopolitical location and relatively high economic
power presented it the chance to claim that role.
The CIS, from very beginning of the independence, though with changing tones, stood
as the central priority of the Russian foreign policy. Having lived within the same political
entity for centuries, Russians did not clearly distinguish between the post-Soviet states and
nations initially. Peoples of the Soviet Union, though mainly concentrated in their national
states, are largely scattered around the former republics, where Russians constituted
substantial minorities, or even majorities. Obviously, because of that characteristic, President
Yeltsin pronounced the central position of CIS in Russian foreign and economic policy
agenda, stating that the nature of Russia’s relations with the states of former Union was not
simply neighbourhood, but “blood kinship”.3 The Soviet experience was another
psychological bond between Russia and the NIS, which can be instrumental to pull the former
Union states together for co-operation in many fields.
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The issue of balance between the post-imperial co-operation among the NIS and
preservation of their sovereignty was a major concern for the new leaderships of the region
and also for the international community. The world was rather suspicious about the Russian
intentions about and future role in the CIS. Kozyrev stated on 26 February 1992 that "Russia
respected the sovereignty of CIS states and wished to build relations with them on an equal
basis, ….. but at the same time, Russia will strictly defend its own interests."4 He continued
with listing three main priorities of the Russian foreign policy concerning the relations with
the CIS members as: economic co-operation and preservation of a unified army; the defence
of human rights; and protection of the Russian and the Russian-speaking population in other
CIS states.5 In the summer of 1992, he further elaborated the evolving Russian attitude
towards the issue, re-emphasising that “Russia’s main foreign policy priority is relations with
[its] partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States.”6:
“Russia entered the CIS on the principle of full equality with the other independent
states. However, Russia cannot afford to forget about the particular responsibility
conferred on it by history. This concerns both nuclear weapons and the obligations
stemming from its status as a great power and permanent member of the UN Security
Council. This status of Russia has been recognized throughout the world and is in no
way in conflict with the creation of the CIS.”7 (Emphases added)
The Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 marked the most important turn of diplomatic
prospects and activity of new Russia, mainly shaped by the domestic debate on foreign policy
that was elaborated in the previous chapter. The document defined the territory of the former
Soviet Union as the vital sphere of interest of the Federation. Russian experts stated that the
new concept was modelled on the “Monroe Doctrine” in defining and describing the aims of
and threats to the Russia in the geopolitical space named as the “Near Abroad”8 (Blizhnee
Zarubezh’e). It included the following principles; “[A]ll of the territory of the former Soviet
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Union constitutes  a vital sphere within which Russia’s interests cannot be denied or ignored;
Because of the deep historic, political, cultural and other links with the neighbouring state,
Russia does not have a moral right to remain deaf to their requests to secure peace; The post-
Soviet space is a “unique, sui generis geopolitical space, in which no one but Russia could
bring peace; Russia will “actively oppose attempts from outside the CIS to increase tension
between the former Soviet republics; Russia will “oppose any plans to increase armed forces
in states bordering on the territory of the former USSR; Russia will restrain the third states
from “attempts to use in their interests the instability in the Near Abroad.”9
In his new year’s address to the Federation Council in 1994, Yeltsin remarked that it is
“Russia’s vocation to be first among equals” within the CIS.10 Russia hoped and obviously
still hopes to bind the former Union republics closely to itself with interpenetrating economic,
military and political ties, and to form a commonwealth in which the leadership would be
saved for Moscow. This leadership, which Kozyrev defined as being the “locomotive of
reform”11 would create a centre of attraction around which the “near abroad” voluntarily
integrate. Moscow sought to institutionalise Russia’s leadership role through a “carrot-and-
stick” approach. The carrots were security under Russia’s nuclear umbrella, territorial
integrity guarantee by the CIS peacekeeping forces, domestic stability and economic largess.
The sticks were the veiled threats of economic sanctions against the states reluctant to
participate.12
The mechanisms for fostering the CIS integration were a series of interstate and inter-
ministerial treaties being worked on within the framework of the Commonwealth. The key
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March 1993, p. 13.
10 Petro and Rubinstein, p. 115.
11 M. A. Smith, “Russian Hegemony in the Near Abroad”, Conflict Studies Research Centre Report, The Royal
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documents constituting the commonwealth and its institutional basis are; the initial CIS
Establishment Treaty of December 1991 signed by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; The CIS
Charter signed in January 1993 Minsk summit by the heads of state; the Collective Security
Agreement concluded in May 1992 in Tashkent; and the Treaty of Economic Union signed in
Moscow by nine of the members in September 1994. One of the most important aspects of
these agreements is that, as a collective military security system modelled after NATO, it
identified an attack to a member as an attack to all. The collective security treaty strongly
supported by Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and Tajikistan, while the rest (especially in the case
of Azerbaijan and Georgia who were literally blackmailed into the treaty through their
weaknesses against the ethnic insurrections within their borders) gave conditional support.
Ukraine, Moldova and Turkmenistan went further to reject the treaty altogether.
3.1.2. CIS as the Instrument of Rebuilding Russian Hegemony
Throughout its history, Russia has gone through cycles of expansion and contraction.13
It was definitely in a phase of contraction after the dissolution of the Soviets, but the historical
pattern demonstrates the possibility of re-expansion, given the geopolitical advantages Russia
possess. Getting out the initial shock of the loss of empire, Russian leaders began to look for a
way to reassert Russian primacy in the region, either by recreating a looser version of the
USSR or simply building a new system of hegemony over the NIS. The strategy of
gosudarstvenniki, the centrist/conservative elements of the Russian political élite who sought
“to strengthen the Russian state”, took the upper hand in the administration especially after
1992-1993. Academician and politician Aleksey Arbatov, summarised the “centrist/moderate-
conservative” view of the Russian political élite concerning the “near abroad” and Russia’s
special role;
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“...Russia is entitled to a special role due to its size historic preponderance, and other
advantages over smaller states, as well as its out-of-area strategic and political
interests. Preserving and if necessary, reinstating its dominant role across the territory
of the former USSR is the principal goal of their vision of Russia foreign policy. This
is to be achieved by manipulation of various factors: economic dependence of some
republics, presence of ethnic Russian population and Russia armed forces on the
territory of others, ethnic and political tensions and border conflicts among them.”14
With respect to the NIS, Russia had to make choice from two different models of
behaviour. One, which might be called imperial or revanchist was aimed at making the post-
Soviet space resemble the USSR as quickly as possible, using any means including stirring of
nationalist and irredentist tendencies among the Russian diaspora in the NIS as the Serbs did
in former Yugoslavian republics. As Russian analyst Pozdnyakov stated, “Every country’s
vital interests include its self-preservation as a specific cultural and historical community”15,
but the important question was which country Russians were interested to preserve; the
Russian Federation or the Soviet Union? The other option, “post-colonial reintegration”,
which envisioned economic salvation of the Russian Federation through close co-operation
with the former Union republics sharing the problems of Russia.16
Russians, with a self-image of a traditional great power, perceived themselves as the
primus (or dominus?) inter pares among the CIS states, with common fresh memory of their
dominant status in the former Soviet Union. The reintegration process within the CIS would
not be not among relative equals but between Moscow as the centre and the NIS as the
periphery.17 The distinction between traditional great power assertiveness and neo-
imperialism has an operational meaning; the latter would be a clear threat to European
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stability.18 In the face of suspicion of over-assertiveness in the near abroad, Russians
emphasise the analogy between the European Union and the CIS, describing the reintegrating
process of the NIS in the post-Soviet space as a primarily economic integration on a voluntary
and equal basis led by Russia, the only country with sufficient level of economic and
technological development.19
President Yeltsin called international organisations including the UN, to  grant Russia
special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR.
Following this speech, Russian Foreign Ministry officially applied to the UN and the OSCE
(then CSCE) for recognition of Russian peacekeeping activities within the CIS.20 This new
attitude of Russian foreign policy was named as the “Monrovskiy Doctrine”21, because of the
parallels that could be drawn with the US Monroe doctrine towards the American “near
abroad”. The idea of adapting the Monroe Doctrine was already being voiced in early 1991,
by the “Eurasianist” Professor Igor Shafarevich, who argued that the Gulf War demonstrated
the necessity for Russia to take a more assertive stance in its “near abroad”.22 Presumably, the
idea was not welcomed in the “near abroad”. Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, argued that the
proposal was unacceptable because it contravened the UN Charter.23
The Western attitude toward the Russian claims of active role in Eurasian security and
stability seems to be positive, since the West was reluctant to assume the burden of
peacemaking and peacekeeping activities in a region too far, too complex and hardly familiar.
This attitude was also partly because of the special importance the West give to the continuity
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of the transformation process of Russia, and its perceived necessity to refrain any action that
would possibly undermine Yeltsin’s domestic policy capabilities. During a visit to Russia in
January 1994, US President Clinton noted that Russia “will be more likely to be involved in
some of these areas near you, just like the United States has been involved in the last several
years in Panama and Grenada and other places near our area.”24  As Paul Goble put it, “if
carefully articulated, Russian interests will find a broad support [in the West] because few
people have any great interests in generating more ‘great games’ between East and West or
between North and South.”25
The main instrument of re-establishing influence over the near abroad for Moscow
was the Russians minorities left in the NIS. By the dissolution of the Union, over 25 million
ethnic Russians and an unknown but presumably large number of native-Russian speakers left
within the former Soviet republics’ borders. According to Stankevich, and the Eurasianist
minded members of the Russian political élite, protection of the interests of ethnic Russians
should be the central task of Russian foreign policy.26 The administration was not indifferent
to the public opinion and the political élite. In January 1994, Kozyrev announced that it is
“one of Moscow’s main strategic interests” to meet the responsibility to protect the interests
of ethnic Russians and Russian speaking people in the “near abroad”.27 In fact, the Article
61/2 of the 1993 Constitution reflected the urge of the Russian government to guarantee “its
citizens’ protection and patronage abroad.”28 However, the government also had to design its
policy towards the NIS with Russian minorities, since unstable relations with the former
Soviet states with substantial number of Russians would threaten the country’s security. It
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was equally important to prevent an unmanageable mass exodus back to Russia which would
endanger the efforts of economic recovery.
There were many extremists too. Throughout the 1990s, the ultra-nationalists and neo-
Unionists were exploiting the information that that millions of Russians residing in the “near
abroad” were suffering from discrimination or ethnic clashes. The Communists regarded the
CIS and the “near abroad” as the first priority for Russian foreign policy. Since they believe
that the USSR has been dissolved illegally, the republics should be reunited and the SU
should be restored. Interestingly, Zyuganov and his adherents ruled out the use of force for
this end, and stated that the restoration should be on a voluntary basis.29  Zhirinovskiy and his
fellow ultra-nationalists in LDPR had a more radical view on the restoration of the empire.
Aleksey Mitrofanov, the LDPR representative in the Committee for International Affairs of
the State Duma, listed “restoring Russia’s strategic boundaries and its historical geopolitical
space,” “bringing Ukraine and Belarus back to Russia” and “regaining the ports in the Black
and Baltic seas” among the national interests to the country. Like the Communists, they
viewed the CIS as the top priority, on the other hand, they also declared that they did not want
to see the former union republics as part of Russia in the near future.30  Aleksandr Rutskoy, a
former vice president, argued that the former Union republics which “call themselves
sovereign and independent never had their own statehood, never in their history. They were
all parts of Russia, a great power.”31 According to the former speaker of the parliament
Ruslan Hasbulatov, post-Soviet states are not “states in the real sense”, since they lacked the
spirit of stateness which can be constructed through history.32 Emil Pain, Yeltsin’s former
chief advisor on nationality affairs, called for a “fragmented imperialism” and Konstantin
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Zatulin, the former head of the Duma’s committee on relations with the CIS, suggested that
Russia should primarily protect ethnic Russians and wherever ethnic minorities are
concentrated33, to help them win autonomy. The Russian should “guarantee special status for
such autonomous regions in the other CIS republics.”34
Factors that incite minority discontent were absent in the ethnic Russian communities
in the near abroad; There was no fear and dislike of national majority, no state actions which
strengthen these fears, nor support and/or manipulation of the ethnic homeland. In none of the
former Union republics, existed a systematic oppression or direct attack against the ethnic
Russians.35 The frequent statements by the Russian administration that it would use force to
protect Russians outside must have an important influence on the political élite of the “near
abroad” who might have initiate ethnic attack on Russian minorities. Russians were given
exclusive rights of citizenship in many NIS. The huge Russian percentage of the population of
Kazakstan forced Nazarbayev to sign an agreement on reciprocal dual citizenship with Russia
in January 1995, although he resisted this idea since the independence. Also, in Kyrgyzstan,
the parliament adopted Russian as an official language. Still, in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, ethnic Russians were already leaving by themselves. The initial motivations were
fear of possible violence and of new language legislation in the republics which, it was feared
could put monolingual Russians at a disadvantage.36 The changing of the Kazak capital to
Astana and full-speed Kazakisation of government posts, seemed to confirm this fear.
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There has been no appearance of effective mass political movements or Serbian-style
nationalist paramilitary forces in the Russian diaspora communities living in the near abroad.
The only “successful” secessionist movement of Russians abroad so far was the case of
Trans-Dnyestr Republic in Moldova. Inside Russia, there were no successful nationalist
parties, and all of the influential nationalist leaders and members of the political élite
remained highly pragmatic rather than acting according to their rhetoric. The movement that
led to the revolt in Trans-Dnyester against the Republic of Moldova was created under Soviet
rule, protected first by the Red Army and then the secessionist state was established by the
help of the Russian 14. Army. The Moscow-backed anti-independence “interfront”
(international front) in Moldova, like its equivalents in many Union republics, had the main
motive of loyalty to the USSR, but not the Russian nationalism per se. 37   Many of its leaders
were Moldavians, while ethnic Russians were in command of the adversary Moldavian state
forces.38
Russian nationalism is quite different than the commonly accepted definition of the
concept. Because of the centuries old imperial history, through which they absorbed so many
ethnic groups and micro-nationalities, Russian nation became a kind of super ethnos. Like
many nations with vivid memories of imperial past, such as Turks, French, Chinese and
Americans, the meaning of the name “Russian” extended to a greater one39, which in turn
weakened the real meaning of the word. Unlike the Turks, who filled the name with a sense of
national consciousness after the Turkish Revolution, Russian national sense was sucked away
by the Sovietisation process. Thus, Russians have rather an imperial consciousness instead of
a national one.40
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3.2. The CIS
Within its region, Russia acted as the status quo power, seeking the preservation of the
old balances and power relationships between the Union republics, doing everything possible
to sabotage the efforts of the weaker states to break out of Russia’s influence. Also, while a
certain degree of interdependence gradually appeared between the NIS, at the centre lied
Russia, with the best geopolitical position to offer leadership to the others.41 There can be
little doubt that within the geo-strategic domain, Russia is the best of option for that role. This
overpowering presence of Russia in the region, is also fed by the perceptions and the
calculations of the leadership of the non-Russian NIS, which were weaker and unprepared
than Russia for the post-Soviet ecosystem. So, Russia sought to institutionalise this central
role and primacy among the successors of the Union by promoting integration within the CIS,
and Russian foreign policy makers began to look to the international events not with naked
eye but through a translucent CIS membrane.
The newly independent states on the former Soviet Union territory can be grouped
according to their heritages of historical and cultural interaction, and their geopolitical
interests/strategies. If the Baltic trio which had already separated its destiny from the rest of
the NIS was excluded, there remained three groups of states with geopolitical linkage; The
Slavic group of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, plus the non-Slavic Moldova; the Southern
Caucasians, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; and the Central Asian republics of Kazakstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Rome” (Tretiy Rim) which brought the Greek/Byzantine cultural influence, Westernisation under Peter I (The
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3.2.1. Gordian Knot: Southern Caucasus:
Russian stabilising policy is the main destabiliser in southern Caucasus. As
Lepingwell puts it, Russian policy concerning the region can be summarised as “taking
advantage of instability and conflict” in the region.42 Moscow pursued the classic Russian
strategy of creating problems and then coming in as a trouble-shooter.43 “Pax Russica” and
“Bellum Russicum” interacted in the sense of an imperial policy.44 The most important armed
conflicts that help Russian achievement of re-establishing influence in the region are the
Azeri-Armenian conflict over Mountainous Karabağ, and the secessionist insurrections in
Georgian autonomous regions of Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The Azeri-Armenian dispute goes back to 1988, when the ethnic Armenian majority in
the Azerbaijani autonomous enclave of Mountainous Karabağ demanded greater autonomy.45
They proclaimed independence as Baku rejected their autonomy demand, and the
disagreement turned into a armed conflict which would lead to all-out war between
Azerbaijan and Armenia soon after the dissolution of the USSR. The imbalance of population
and perceived military power, led the Armenians to offer the northern “big brother” loyalty in
international affairs and issues related to the post-Soviet integration, in return for Russian
political, economic and military support. Besides the tactical assistance and arms supply,
Russian 366th infantry regiment actively participated in the Armenian capture of Hocalı on 26
February 1992.46 In exchange of this strategic backing against their arch enemies, and
motivated with the fear of Turkish encirclement, Armenia became the strongest supporter of
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firm ties with Russia, being one of the quickest to ratify the CIS Charter, and also the quickest
to permit Russian troops to be stationed within its borders47.
Russian influence penetration through the Azerbaijani border realised later than its
western rival. In July 1993, nationalist government of pro-Turkish President of Azerbaijan,
Ebulfez Elçibey was ousted by a military coup led by Colonel Suret Hüseyinov. Hüseyinov
had “luckily” left with a couple of depots full of heavy arms by the withdrawing Soviet
troops48, and after a short march from Gence to Baku, Elçibey was replaced with former
politburo member Haydar Aliyev. Under the new leadership, Azerbaijani foreign policy
observably shifted toward Russia, abandoning the pro-Turkish orientation of the overthrown
nationalists. In a visit to Moscow soon after his seizing of power, Aliyev announced that
Elçibey’s “serious error” of keeping Azerbaijan out of the CIS would be corrected
immediately.49 Baku’s CIS policy after the fall of Elçibey can be summarised as “preserving
the independence and refraining from angering Moscow.”50
Threats for ethnic secession in other places of Azerbaijan also appeared, allegedly
directly flared by Moscow, to force Baku to accept accession to the CIS and secure its
commitment to it. Russians were reported to support the separatists in the northern border
areas to Dagestan, where Sadval Movement worked towards uniting parts of Dagestan and
Azerbaijan into one republic of the Lezgins.51 Also the Talysh-Mugan Republic was
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proclaimed by Elikram Hümbetov, but these movements “surprisingly” lost pace with
accession to CIS.52
Accession to the CIS and its military structures gave the Azeris the chance to
pressurise Russia to accommodate their concerns about the Karabağ conflict and in addition to
that,  the issue of disposition of the Caspian oil riches. Against the Russian proposals of
treatment of the Caspian Sea as internal sea, whose resources should be exploited by the
littoral states, but not external actors, the Azerbaijan pursued its own course, signing a deal
with a western led consortium.
All three southern Caucasian states have vital importance for the Russian strategy in
the region, but since their national interests and policy orientations differ radically, Russia
faces a dilemma on implementing a equitable crude policy which would alienate at least one
of them or a carefully calculated multi-faceted set of policies which would only accommodate
immediate whims of the states, rather than solving the stalemate. Among the three Azerbaijan
has a distinct importance as the largest state in the region, being a key link between the
European and Turkish worlds, and a gateway to the south-western Asia. Thus, anchoring
Azerbaijan in the CIS is one of the most important policy priorities of the Russian Federation.
Russia also keeps in mind the near danger of loosing its dominating influence in the region to
Turkey.
       Russia succeeded in breaking the initial reluctance of Georgia to join the CIS
getting use of its weakness against a series of ethnic separatist insurrections on Georgian
territory. Following the failure of republican forces in their struggle with the secessionist
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armed groups in Abkhazian53 and Southern Ossetian54 autonomous enclaves, and the civil
strife that ensued after the ouster of the first president of the republic Zviad Gamsakhurdia,
Georgia had to give in gradually to Russian pressure. Although President Yeltsin and foreign
ministry seemed to act as mediators and peacemakers in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the
Russian generals kept on lending assistance to the Abkhaz insurrection below the negotiation
table, thwarting the politically achieved accords between the sides.55 According to Satter,
Russian defence and intelligence officials were behind the declaration of independence of
Abkhazia.56 Russia also supported a campaign led by the so-called Confederation of the
Peoples of Northern Caucasus57, allegedly founded by Moscow, directed other Muslims of the
region for supplying the Abkhaz with mujahids.58 Russia gave another message to Georgian
leadership when the Minister of Defence, Grachov visited Ajaria, another ethnic enclave in
Georgia, without notifying Tbilisi.59 The new Georgian leadership, headed by the former
Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze, has come to regard the 20,000 Russian peacekeepers to
be stationed in these regions as the price of Georgia must pay to preserve its independence
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and territorial integrity.60 Furthermore, the bilateral agreements concluded by Georgia and
Russia on 3 February 1994 gave the Russians the right to establish permanent military bases61
in Georgian territory and station CIS (Russian) troops on the Turkish border. In Brzezinski’s
words, Georgia learned that “Russia as umpire [was] not very different from Russia as
empire.”62 Shevardnadze, considering the material and logistical weaknesses of his country
against further ethnic conflict and lack of domestic energy sources, believed that
accommodating Russian drive for fulfilling the “peacekeeping role” in the region is a strategic
necessity. He even openly supported the Russian military campaign against Chechen ethnic
secessionism in 1994,63 bearing in mind the hope of being allowed to regain authority in his
autonomous enclaves which are de facto independent from Georgia.
3.2.2. The Nearer Abroad: Central Asia
Russian policies in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia were very different in
practice. While incinerating and taking advantage of instability and conflict in the Caucasus,
Russia implemented policies to strengthen stability in the Central Asian republics. The main
instrument for this pro-stability policy is direct support for the leaders of these countries.
Another difference in policy is the Russian preference of multilateralism in Central Asia,
while proceeding with bilateral relations and excluding multilateral institutions and political
fora in the southern Caucasus.64
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The five Central Asian republics of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan
and Tajikistan have been the most eager group of Union heirs to join the Russian led CIS,
with their hurried signing of all of the basic CIS treaties. The Central Asian leaders agreed to
co-operate with Russia voluntarily, without apparent pressure, but not because of internal or
external coercion, since they perceive it as a power capable of safeguarding regional stability
and also their authoritarian-type regimes. Except for Turkmenistan, which prefers bilateral
relations with Russia, all the republics in the region have welcomed multilateral co-operation
with the Russian Federation within the CIS.65 In the words of Uzbek President Islam
Kerimov, Russia is the guarantor of “stability and peace in [the] region and preserving the
integrity of [NIS] borders.”66
The political élite of these republics were highly secularised and Russified through
roughly seventy years of Communist rule, and they are rigidly determined not to let the power
go from their grip. Most of the Central Asian republics (with the exception of Tajikistan) are
ruled by authoritarian leftover Soviet apparatchiks. During the process of dissolution of the
Union, and in the following transitory period, their leadership helped keeping the countries'
institutions and policies intact, and facilitated a smooth passage to independence, however,
their prolonged authoritarian administration seems to lag the democratisation process, in
which the other republics in the west are far ahead.
The authoritarian leaders of the Central Asian NIS were aware of the fact that their
survival and economic recovery are highly interdependent, for none of them can succeed
without support from the others or Russian Federation67.  Thus, the necessity of establishing
an efficient network of bilateral and multilateral relations, intensifying the trade among
themselves, close co-operation in investments, particularly on the areas of energy,
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transportation and communications, were well recognised by the leaders. They could also see
that Russia, with its unmatched power and potential, cannot be pushed out of the region
easily, and it can be a useful partner in the process of recovery if its whims like the protection
of the rights of (ethnic Russian) minorities, could be accommodated. In general, Central Asian
leaders prefer a flexible pragmatic foreign policy comprised of short-term moves which is
mainly motivated by the leaderships’ self-survival, rather than a coherent one following
predetermined set of principles. Not having the luxury to alienate possible partners in their
search for economic well-being, they keep close relations with every power around; Russia,
Turkey, Iran, China, India, the USA, and key European states, most of which are attracted to
the region because of the vast energy sources it promises. They had to pursue balanced
policies towards all the actors around, and diversify international contacts in political,
economic and military fields.
The relations between Russia and the Central Asians were not a perfect fairy tale
either. Wary of dependence to Russia, especially in the fields of economy and security, most
of them began to separate their policies from mainstream CIS and Russian policies.
Uzbekistan, along with Georgia and Azerbaijan have refused to prolong the CIS Collective
Security  Agreement in April 1999. A strong tendency to decrease the number of Russian
military presence in the near abroad appeared. Aliyev stated that the Russian bases in
Armenia were direct threats to the peace and stability in the Caucasus region.68 Georgian
leadership also wanted to remove the three Russian military bases within its borders. In the
OSCE Istanbul Summit of November 1999, Russia agreed to close its base in Vaziani by 1
July 2001. Another source of discontent between Russia and some of the CIS members is the
competition in gas and oil exploitation and transportation. Turkmen-Russian competition in
deciding pipeline routes that will transport Turkmen gas to world markets is one of the
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manifestations of the competition. The signing of “Blue Stream” gas deal between Ankara
and Moscow also caused a tension between Turkmenistan and the two parties of the
agreement in 1997.
3.2.3. The Soviet West: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova
After the demise of the USSR, the three westernmost republics of the former Union
constituted a new buffer zone between Europe and the Russian Federation. The post-Soviet
order distanced Russia further than ever from “Europe proper”, for several centuries. Russia is
now separated from Europe by a chain of states and was more distant from it than ever.69 In
order to reduce this distance, Russia had to re-establish its presence in the three new states of
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.
The smaller republic of Moldova was under Romanian control until World War II,
when it was annexed by the USSR and established as a Union republic by Stalin in order to
punish Romania for allying with the Third Reich. As Stalin made some territorial
arrangements to disrupt the integrity of the Moldovan (Romanian) population of the republic,
merging the band in the southern coast with Ukraine and adding a small pocket of Ukrainian
land to Moldova in the north. This arrangements left Moldova with large Russian and
Ukrainian minorities, who are considerably apprehensive about the possible unification of the
republic with its kin Romania. This fear initiated the civil war in the north-eastern part of the
republic, even before the dissolution of the USSR, where the ethnic Russians proclaimed their
own republic across the Dnyester River70. The Dnyester Republic had the backing of, first the
Soviet71, then Russian Fourteenth Army. The Russian Federation directly intervened in the
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conflict in Moldova in the Summer of 1992, when the in famous Fourteenth Army under the
command of Major-General Aleksandr Lebed sent for assistance to, and protection of, the
breakaway “Republic of Dnyester”. The official motive was to “protect the Russian
minority”, but Lebed accused Moldova being a fascist state, and announced that his army
recognised the Dnyester Republic as legal and sovereign.72 According to Andranik
Migranyan, then Yeltsin’s councillor on foreign affairs, when it was clear to the Russian
leadership that the West would not strongly object, Russian foreign policy makers moved to
unconditional defence of the Dnyester Republic.73 The Moldovan leadership, facing the
danger of fragmentation of the country, had to come to terms with Russia through the CIS.
They succeeded in convincing Yeltsin to withdraw the Fourteenth Army with the treaty of
October 1994, in return for greater autonomy to the Trans-Dnyester Republic. Moldova
rejoined the CIS in April 1994, following the electoral success of the pro-Russian parties, and
in August, General Lebed was removed from command of the Fourteenth Army, which was
also being withdrawn gradually.74
Belarus presents an interesting example with the overwhelming majority of its
population eager to join the Russian Federation, and/or restore the USSR. It has no sense of
nationalism in the traditional sense, or a sort of Russophobia to relate.75 This social tendency
brought the enthusiastically pro-Russian and authoritarian Aleksandr Lukashenka to power in
Belarus, and he persistently realised a gradual plan of reintegration with Russia since then.
The two countries signed a customs union treaty on 12 April 1994, eliminated customs
controls in July 1995, and in December 1999, Yeltsin and Lukashenka signed a treaty, which
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created a “Union State” comprised of Russia and Belarus. Belarus have already ceased to
remove the nuclear missiles, which were agreed to be returned to Russia, since the two
countries will soon reunite. Throughout the decade Belarus seemed more eager for unification
than Russia did, that in many occasions its officials criticised Moscow of loosing time in the
process of integration, with “childish competition” with other republics around.76
It was clear that the most strategically and psychologically important country for
Russia in the region is Ukraine, with its large size and population, potentially rich agricultural
base, well-developed industrial infrastructure, and world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. It also
represented the lost strategic depth, natural ports cut for naval bases, numerous military
installations and sites of strategic importance for Moscow. Besides the psychological value of
Ukraine, which had been an indivisible part of the Russian Empire since the 1654 Pereyeslavl
Treaty signed by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskiy,  the importance of the country is substantial
for the fate of the Russian Federation as Zbigniew Brzezinski stated; “without Ukraine Russia
ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia
automatically becomes an empire.”77 Most of the members of the political élite in Russia
agreed that Ukrainian independence was an abnormality as well as a threat for Russia’s
standing as a global power.78  Initially, Ukrainian independence was perceived in Moscow as
a “transitory phenomenon”.79 However in time, Russia has formally committed itself to
respect Ukraine’s independence, but only on the condition that independence does not
threaten Russian security.80
The two foremost issues that continuously hampered close relations between Russia
and Ukraine were the disposition of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet (BSF), and the political status
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of the autonomous republic of Crimea.  Deciding the future of the Black Sea Fleet, which was
comprised of 833 ships, had been the most tiresome of processes, with long fruitless
negotiations and several tentative agreements. In September 1993, former Ukrainian President
Leonid Kravchuk agreed to restore the entire fleet to Russia in exchange for wiping out of its
debt, but the Verkhovna Rada, the Parliament of Ukraine, rejected this deal. A subsequent
agreement in April 1994 giving less than a quarter of the fleet to Ukraine was also proved to
be fruitless. Even after the relatively pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma’s ascension to presidency,
Ukraine did not give in to the Russian pressure over the BSF. In time, not only the fleet itself,
but the status of the Crimean port/city of Sevastopol, the fleet’s base became the most
important issue between the two countries. Through the process, the BSF issue turned into a
test of sovereignty over the city and the naval base. In search for a counterbalance to the
Russian pressure over the BSF, Ukraine also supported the Georgian claims to a portion of the
fleet.  In October 1997, an agreement was signed between Russia and Georgia to transfer to
Georgia four warships. The other major obstacle between the two countries was the issue of
political status of the Crimea.  Administrative jurisdiction over the Crimea was transferred to
Ukraine from RSFSR on 26 April 1954 by the then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to
commemorate the 300th anniversary of the union of Russia and Ukraine81. Since nothing
changed for the residents of the peninsula then, as they were still subjects of the USSR, and
the issue of status Crimean enclave had never been effectively discussed since early 1991
when the predominantly Russian regional soviet claimed autonomy. In 5 December 1992, the
Crimean parliament even declared independence from Ukraine, a move which led to its
dissolution by Kyiv and placing of Crimea under direct Ukrainian government control.
Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin and Kozyrev distanced themselves from the dispute, while some other
Russian politicians such as State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin and president’s advisor Sergei
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Filatov were overtly supported the independence efforts of Russians of Crimea.82 During a
visit to the peninsula in 1992, former vice-president Rutskoy declared the 1954 hand over as
illegal.83 Russian government and foreign policy did not officially and directly supported the
secessionist movement from the Ukraine.84 Under strong pressure of the Duma, Kozyrev
stated that the 1954 decision to turn the Crimea over to the Ukraine was "a political decision
of the old politburo"85, but added that the issue of autonomy or independence of the peninsula
was Ukraine’s “internal affair”. In January 1994, Yuriy Meshkov of the Republican
Movement of Crimea elected the president of Crimea, and when he visited Moscow in 1994
to seek help in securing greater autonomy from the Ukraine, he was not officially received
and Russian leaders paid considerable attention on not to increase tensions with their southern
neighbour. This lack of overt support for the Crimean Russian government could be explained
by  the pragmatism of the Russian leaders dominating the administration. On 31 May 1997,
Yeltsin and Kuchma in Kyiv signed "Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership"
between Russia and Ukraine. As a result, Russia endorsed the territorial borders of Ukraine,
gave up the claims over the Crimean Peninsula, where ethnic Russians were the majority, and
the old Russian city and naval base of Sevastopol to Ukraine.86 However, this treaty also gave
Moscow the right to use Sevastopol as its main naval base for the next two decades. It took
two more years for the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada to ratify the treaty with a slight majority.
Ukraine’s interest in the CIS partly depended on the belief that it would be a
supranational entity which will play a stabilising role in the initial years of transition, which
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would also protect Ukraine from Caucasian-Moldovan style ethnic conflicts endangering
country’s independence or territorial integrity; and partly it originated from the fact that the
post-Soviet countries were highly dependent on one other in economic affairs, given the
Moscow-engineered web of interdependence on industry, transportation and communications.
Both factors proved to be well perceived by Kyiv, since Ukraine resourcefully used the Soviet
web in economic recovery and, more importantly, was shielded against the wave of ultra-
nationalist, ethnic insurrections rocking the neighbouring capitals. Actually Ukraine was not a
de jure member of the CIS, since the parliament never ratified the CIS Charter, and  the
Collective Security Treaty was not even signed. Furthermore, the strong presence of Ukraine
in the CIS, ensured that the CIS remain a loose discussion club rather than evolve into a new
geopolitical entity with supranational structures.87
3.2.4. Polarisation in the Commonwealth: The GUUAM Group
In May 1995, seven out of twelve CIS members signed the treaty on joint protection of
the external CIS borders at the Minsk Summit, while Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan refused to join.  These five states were not pleased with the
military-weighted orientation of the CIS integration process, while the initial priorities of
economic recovery and political stability were being pushed behind. The concept of “external
borders of the CIS” was also irritating some of the members, as Ukrainian President
Kuchma’s statement displayed; “there is no CIS external borders of the CIS but each state has
its external and internal borders.”88 The security dimension of the CIS weakened more in the
spring of 1999, when Uzbekistan refused to renew the CIS mutual defence treaty, and
Georgia, Turkmenistan and Kazakstan followed suit. Articulations of Azerbaijani and
Georgian intentions to welcome NATO or Turkish bases within their territories were also
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angering the Russian military planners. Commending on the Western intervention in the
Kosovo conflict in Yugoslavia, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General A. Kvashnin
warned on 15 November 1999 that Moscow sees the possibility that NATO may be willing to
use force on the territory of the former Soviet Union, among other places.89
By the end of the decade, Russian Federation failed to institutionalise the CIS as a
operational security system under its leadership. Most of the CIS states did not recognise the
authority of CIS as peacekeeper, and the Collective Security Treaty of 1992 remained with
only six signatories, namely Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Of the more than 700 agreements signed within the CIS framework, none seems to work
properly.90 Frustrated with the inefficiency of the organisation, former minister of CIS affairs
Anatoliy Adamishin called the Commonwealth a “building without a foundation”.91 At a press
conference on 9 September 1995, Yeltsin said that Russia was ready to create a new military-
political bloc with the CIS members, patterned after the Warsaw Pact,92 an mis-tailored
declaration which constituted a major reason of the reluctance of the NIS leaders to be herded
into the collective security institution of the CIS is the fear that commitment to such a
Warsaw Pact-style organisation would guarantee Russian hegemony.93
On 10 October 1997 in Strasbourg, the most Western-prone (or anti-Russian?)
members of the CIS; Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova created a sub-regional co-
operative body, with a joint communiqué on the planned Transport Corridor Europe-
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Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA). The group was joined by Uzbekistan on 24 April 1999 during
the NATO summit in Washington DC. The group was named GUUAM after the members’
initials. The group, comprised of the members of the Commonwealth minus the signatories of
the 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty94, was primarily intended to counterbalance the
influence of Moscow and its loyal satellites. The group generally aligned with the Western
positions in international fora, and supported the non-Russian alternatives for Caspian fuel
transportation in order to reduce the dependence on Moscow. One of the GUUAM’s priorities
is the development of Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA), which would
contribute to the revival of the “Silk Road”. Russian administration naturally viewed this
group and its integrative designs in the security field as an anti-Russian military bloc in
formation. For the time being academician and politician Arbatov’s premonition seems to be
realising. In 1992, he wrote, if the maximum task of economic and political integration of the
CIS would turn out to be unattainable, “the minimum task [would be] to prevent the
appearance of a hostile coalition of other republics, which will inevitably try to gain support
from outside.”95
GUUAM denied that it would assume any military dimension, but its members’
participation in the NATO summit in April 1999, their enthusiasm in co-operation with
NATO exacerbated Moscow’s suspicion. Moreover, Azeri Defense Minister Sefer Abiyev
stated that military co-operation among the GUUAM members has a strategic character as it
ensures their independence, and Georgian Deputy Defence Minister Grigol Katamadze added
that the military co-operation stems from the coincidence of strategic interests of the member
states and is not directed against any other parties.96 Another hard evidence of transformation
of the GUUAM group to a sort of security partnership is the joint Azeri-Georgian-Ukrainian
military exercise in April 1999, with the objective of protecting the Baku-Supsa pipeline
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network. Russian perceptions of the group displayed variation. While Yegor Stroev, the
chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Parliament expressed his belief that this
grouping would not constitute a threat to Russian interests, Russian Foreign minister Ivanov
warned in September 1999, that Moscow will “draw the appropriate conclusions” if it
becomes military-based in nature.97 Asking suspiciously why the GUUAM was formed in
Strasbourg and Washington, he defined the alliance as a political organisation with plans to
transform itself into a military one.98
Whether it will turn out to be a military co-operation platform or not, it is clear that the
GUUAM became a reactionary axis against the Russian political and military domination
within the CIS. Kuzio makes a distinction between the Russophiles/Slavophiles comprised of
Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikitan; and the Pragmatic
Westernisers, which are Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldova.99 According
to Kuzio, traditionally pro-Russian Belarus, de facto Russian protectorates of Armenia and
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan under Chinese threat, and Kazakstan with a huge native-Russian-
speaking population, were natural allies of the Russian Federation, while the pragmatic
westernisers had adequate reasons to fear Russia and balance its power with an alliance.
Turkmenistan, although remained neutral, was close to the GUUAM and its projects of by-
passing Russia with alternative pipeline projects.100 Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan
and Armenia ran counter to the geopolitical interests of the neighbouring countries. In
Tajikistan, Russian political and military support kept Rahmanov in power, and this blocked
the way of Kerimov’s ambitions to promote a pro-Uzbek administration in Dushanbe. Strong
Russian foothold in Armenia is already giving chills to Azerbaijan and Georgia, who are
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interested in getting rid of the remains of Russian hegemony as soon as possible. Georgian
parliamentary speaker Zurab Zhvania directly defined Russia and Iran as the enemies of the
GUUAM alliance, and praised the group’s energy route project as a chance to connect the
members to each other and to the world, and to keep them free from political pressure and
influence.101 The main objectives of the GUUAM were, to oppose the dominant role of
Russia, to remove the CIS as a regional organisation, to deprive the right of the CIS to
represent them in international fora, and to integrate into the transatlantic and European
structures in the long term.102
Although the GUUAM presents a useful leverage against the Russian hegemony in the
target regions of Turkish foreign policy, Turkish government had been careful not to express
any sentiments about the group since its inception. Despite the formal Turkish negligence of
the group, Armenians perceive the GUUAM as a result of purposeful geo-strategic initiatives
of Turkey.103 Whatever the Turkish stance is, the clock ticks in favour of the geopolitical
pluralism thesis of Brzezinski; as long as the polarised situation persists within the
commonwealth, the CIS, thus the Russian hegemony fades.
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54
Chapter III:
DAVID IN GOLIATH’S BACKYARD:
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN EURASIA
4.1. Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War
4.1.1. Cold War Claustrophobia of Turkish Foreign Policy
Turkey, since the foundation of the Republic, pursued a foreign policy of non-
alignment and non-interference even in its immediate surroundings. Non-alignment policy
came to an end in 1952 with its membership to NATO, but the pacifistic character of foreign
policy persisted. As Makovsky accurately pointed out; “throughout the Cold War, Turkish
Foreign Policy was typically insular and passive, encapsulated by Turkish diplomats with the
saying attributed to Kemal Atatürk 'Peace at home, peace abroad'”1. The official line of
foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey has referred to a strong anti-imperialism and a
narrow sense of nationalism, which promotes linguistic and territorial Turkishness, giving up
the Ottoman imperial ambitions over non-Turkish nations around its borders.
The initial caution of the Republic and its foreign ministry cadres can be explained by
the typical young state behaviour of seeking peace until the phase of nation building was
complete. The Republic, trying to re-erect the country over the ruins of the Ottoman Empire
had to pursue a policy free from risk-taking, adventurist policies. Leadership was acutely
aware of the fact that peace was an imperative for the survival, independence, and territorial
integrity of a country still in stagnation, and cautious, pragmatic non-alignment was the best
option for the initial phase. After the World War II, under the Soviet threat over the Straits
and the Eastern Anatolia, non-alignment became obsolete as a guarantee of survival, and the
country officially allied with the West by joining NATO in 1952., strengthening its
commitment to integration into the Western civilisation. Even under NATO umbrella, Turkey
never felt secure enough to pursue policies that would anger the northern Soviet giant.
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Consistent policy of protecting its national independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity required a strict isolation and indifference toward even the immediate environment
of the country, which Turkey preferred to stay away from the political developments, conflicts
and wars. The only exception for the cautious, isolationist and non-interventionist policy of
Turkey is the "Cyprus Peace Operation", in which Turkish armed forces occupied the north of
the island, and helped establish an independent Turkish Cypriot state there in 1983.
4.1.2. Post-Cold War Metamorphosis
Turkish perception of the international system, its foreign policy and self-image of the
country’s role in the region and the world, changed drastically since the late 1980s, with the
huge tectonic changes in its immediate vicinity, reshaping the scenarios and actors in the
game of world politics. Within the general scope of Turkish foreign policy, the share and
importance of Eurasian space in the North and East grew tremendously, as a new
“chessboard” presenting Turkey with new opportunities and challenges. As the most feared
northern bear left his cave to a humbler one and numerous smaller neighbours, Turkey’s
security and foreign policy priorities were needed to be reassessed.
The Gorbachov era and his “new thinking” in international relations forced Turkey to
fine-tune its relations with the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. Accelerated with a rapid
economic intensification of economic activity, from 1987 onwards, Turkey pursued a strategy
of economic interdependence in order to enhance bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.
Turkish foreign policy of this period was still negligent of the Turkic elements in the USSR,
and the main concern was enhancing bilateral trade relations with Moscow. Mainly because
of the long-term negligence, Turkish leadership knew little about the Central Asian and
Caucasian Turkic republics within the USSR, even about the ones, which Turkey had very
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strong, ties a short time ago. Premier Turgut Özal, on a visit to the US before the dissolution
of the USSR, declared that Turkey had little affinity for the predominantly Shiite Azerbaijan.2
The “new thinking”, “Common European Home”, the fall of Berlin Wall and the
consequent easing of the tensions of superpower confrontation, ended the claustrophobia
Turkey had been suffering for half a century, but also gave a strong blow on the strategic
importance of Turkey for the West. The European Community’s rejection of Turkey’s
application for membership in 1989 confirmed the Turkish fear that Europe no longer needed
Turkey as an ally in the post-Soviet world order.3 The end of Cold War seemed to evaporate
Turkey’s role overnight as the easternmost bulwark of the West against the “evil empire”.
However, international events once more incubated a change in politics and
perceptions in the vicinity of Turkey, when Saddam`s Iraq invaded its small oil-rich
neighbour Kuwait in August 1990.  Turgut Özal, now as the president, was presented with a
golden opportunity to pursue a more activist foreign policy in the region and demonstrate the
Western mistake in its recent re-evaluation of strategic prominence of Turkey. The support he
put to the US-led anti-Iraqi coalition’s military intervention in January 1991, despite its
middle–term damage on the country’s economy and trade, attracted appreciation of this
strategic significance as the easternmost Westerner.
This significance was deepened further, as the seismic change in the north shocked the
whole world, and the three-quarters century old Soviet Empire disappeared by the end of
1991.   The post-Soviet milieu presented Turkey a new world to discover, and an opportunity
for Ankara to break Turkey’s double faceted isolation between Europe and the Arab world,
being excluded from the former and refused itself to approach the latter.4 However, the
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change in the foreign policy of Turkey, since it was dictated by the dynamics of regional and
global scale politics as a fait accompli, was unnatural, euphoric and uncoordinated. The main
reason of the lack of co-ordination and coherence of initial policy towards the post-Soviet
order was the absence of institutional and ideational preparedness for such a change. The long
negligence of the individual republics of the Soviet Union and shortage of experts and
experience prevented the formulation of a coherent policy towards the NIS.
The absence of an institutional base and resistance of foreign policy bureaucracy to
leave its traditional cautious policy caused tension between the ministry and the leadership,
weakening the co-ordination among the policy makers and shifting the importance toward
individuals rather than organisations. While the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
symbolised the cautious, pragmatic and pro-Western element of the foreign policy making
mechanism, Özal symbolised the ambitious one.  Özal’s approach to the foreign policy was
overriding the established procedures and institutions. He often by-passed the foreign ministry
and other actors of foreign policy mechanism, and this attitude became more apparent during
the Gulf Crisis of 1990-19915. He, intentionally or not, reshaped the way of conduct of
foreign policy as a system only he could operate, probably to assure his indispensability
within Turkish political stage.6
Following his death, the ministry again reasserted its role as the main actor in foreign
policy, under the leadership of Minister Hikmet Çetin. In this phase, Turkey emerged as a
weighty force for stability and continuity, adapting the traditional cautious policy since
Atatürk to the requirements of the newly formed geopolitical environment. The drastic change
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Sonrası, Liberte Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, pp. 111-216. Also see Simon V. Mayall, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition,
McNair Paper 56, INSS, January 1997, pp. 53-67.
58
in the geopolitical environment forced the ministry to reorganise and acquire more expertise
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Although Çetin’s prime minister Demirel had a strong
political personality in domestic politics, stood besides the ministry and supported the
organisational policy making processes. Demirel’s main contribution to the foreign policy of
Turkey, as prime minister and president, is determining the principle of acting jointly with
other countries, under international auspices.7 This principle has been unchangeably followed
by the foreign policy mechanism ever since.
Tansu Çiller, Demirel’s successor as prime minister and later the minister of foreign
affairs, is known to take Özal as her idol in politics. Although she initially garnered
considerable international sympathy as a the first women in the leadership of Turkey, her lack
of experience and ability in foreign policy formulation and conduct depleted the loaned
respect, especially when she decided to coalesce with the Islamist Prosperity (Refah) Party in
August 1996. Çiller’s incoherent foreign policy mainly directed to cram Turkey into the
European Union Customs Union and creating a Muslim economic-political commonwealth of
Developing Eight (D-8) ended in June 1997, when İsmail Cem was appointed foreign minister
in the new Yılmaz coalition government. From then on, ministry reasserted its primacy in the
diplomatic schemes under Cem, however, was criticised for being extensively Euro-centric,
and increasingly negligible of the Eurasia.
One major change in the foreign policy of Turkey is the perception of its role its
immediate vicinity and the globe. “[C]urrent Turkish policy is formulated on the concept that
the country’s strategic significance, derived from its territorial location, is not static, but
dynamic”8. Released from the Cold War clichés, Turkey no longer perceives itself as a
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“bridge, barrier or a bulwark”, but an independent, self-conscious regional power after its own
interests. Still, the Western-orientation persists. “Western orientation is one aspect of Turkish
foreign Policy which has remained unchanged through the history of the Republic.”9 Sander
states that, developing relations with the NIS in the Caucasus and Central Asia, would not
distract Turkey from its Western orientation, but would act complementary to it.10 The
establishment and strengthening of Turkish ties with the region would project Western
influence to the area and facilitate incorporation of the NIS into the world community.
Understandably, this character of Turkish foreign policy, negatively effects the non-Western
and anti-Western regional actors’ perception of Turkey, adding the country in the shortlist of
threats.
4.2. Turkey and Eurasia
4.2.1. Grand Opening in Eurasia: Euphoria and Frustration
When the dissolution of the next “Sick Man of Europe” was imminent, Turkey became
the first country to recognise the NIS. The recognition of the independence of the Soviet
republics came before the de jure dissolution of the Union, an event that does not comfortably
fit to the traditional pattern of the cautious Turkish foreign policy behaviour. President Özal,
bedazzled with the opportunities the systemic change in the international structure can bring,
adopted Demirel`s definition of the Turkish world: “From the Adriatic to the Great Wall”.
“The 21st century will be the Turkish century” became the motto of the leadership, and an
over-ambitious, but non-institutional offensive of businessmen and statesmen was launched to
the “Turkish fatherland” (Atayurt). For the first time in the history of the Republic, Turkey
sought to establish a sphere of influence, giving up the tradition of shyness in foreign policy.11
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A Turkic unity, or at least a commonwealth based on economic relations seemed possible to
even the most sceptical analysts in this euphoric period.
Without a serious general strategy or a designed blueprint of Turkey-NIS relations,
Turkey initiated ad hoc policy measures and several unprecedented bodies to facilitate
penetration into the region, such as the Turkish International co-operation Agency (Türk
İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı – TICA/TİKA), Joint Administration of Turkish Cultures and
Arts (Türk Kültür ve Sanatları Ortak Yönetimi – TÜRKSOY), joint business councils, and
Turkic Summit, TICA was founded within the structure of the foreign ministry in January
1992, to co-ordinate economic, cultural and technical assistance to and projects in the
southern NIS of former Soviet Union. In the words of its first director, Umut Arık, three main
aims of Turkey to realise through TICA were; the establishment of free and efficient
international telecommunications and transportation connections; the creation of international
banking links; and the generation of the finance to ensure economic livelihood.12 Another new
actor in relations between Turkey and the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union is the Joint
Administration of Turkish Culture and Arts  (TÜRKSOY) which is an institution sponsored
mainly by the Turkish Ministry of Culture.
In 1991 and 1992, official visits exchanged between the Turkic states frequently, and
bilateral treaties in many field were concluded. Prime Minister Demirel, toured all the Turkic
states in April and May 1992, and declared in Baku that Turkey has accepted the
“responsibility to represent the Turkic world”. Turkish business centres were established,
joint councils on economic affairs, trade and culture were set up, huge delegations of official
and civilian level were exchanged and loans expanded to the needy Turkic “brothers” by
Turkish Eximbank. With the intensification of relations in innumerable fields, the enthusiasm
for the possibility of a sort of unity among the Turkic states was increasing, absence of the
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strong Russian opposition was contributing to the optimism. Election of Ebülfez Elçibey, the
staunchly pro-Turkish nationalist leader of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), as the new
President of the Azerbaijani Republic in 1992 was another source of optimism for Turkish-
NIS relations. In this atmosphere, TICA’s first director went so far as to proclaim the Turkic
states of the former Soviet Union as Turkey’s “near abroad”.13
In Özal’s agenda, the most important instrument of closing together the Turkic states
was the ambitious initiative of the Turkic Summit14. Turkey, convened the six
Turkish/Turkic15 States around a table in Ankara on 30-31 October 1992, with the hope of a
concrete result of commitment to a certain level of unity between the countries. However, the
meeting was a big disappointment for Turkey, since, especially the Central Asian leaders were
reluctant to rule out the opportunities that the rest of  the power foci present. It was the first
sign of the evaporation of the euphoria of Turkic unity. Although Özal’s hope for a Turkic
commonwealth was not realised, these periodical meetings became important fora of co-
operation for the six parties. After the 1992 Ankara summit, five more summits followed, in
Istanbul, Bishkek, Tashkent, Astana and Baku.
Following the diplomatic failure of the Ankara summit came the most damaging blow
to the project of Turkish influence penetration to the NIS, when Elçibey was ousted by a
military coup. There were more than enough evidence to believe that Moscow was behind the
act, directly or indirectly, and Russian influence was beginning to take the upper hand in the
region’s affairs. Increasing Russian assertiveness within the CIS gradually faded the
enthusiasm for the desired level of co-operation among the Turkic states and the Turkic unity
approach was abandoned after 1993.
                                                          
13 Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After, John Murray, London, 1997, p.288..
14 Officially called as the Turkish-Speaking States Summits.
15 Prior to 1990s, there was no term in (Turkey’s) Turkish language for the English word “Turkic” (or the
Russian word “tyurkskiy”) to denote the Turks which had never been a part of the Ottoman/Western Turkish
world, or the “Turks” in general. By 1991, the word Türki was created by adding the Arabic suffix designating
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4.2.2. New Turkish Policy towards the Russia: Who Fears the Big Bad Bear?
The long history of continuous conflict between Turkey and Russia is full of negative
images that amalgamated into a pile of suspicion, resentment and fear on each side, a legacy
which would certainly haunt the minds of their respective political élite for a while. For the
Turkish side, the image of imperialist Russian putting the Ottomans on a continuous retreat
southwards is strengthened by the oppressive Soviet policies over the Turkish nations of the
USSR. The contribution of the Cold War Western propaganda is also important in
aggravating the negative image of the Russian in the Turkish eyes. On the other side of the
sea, the memory of the so-called “Tatar Yoke”, the image of the Sultan as the oppressor of the
Orthodox peoples and the late Ottoman aspirations of pan-Turkism directed against Russian
territorial integrity, are important factors in the Russian view of the Turks. Russians feel a
deep-rooted dislike to the descendants of their former rulers who pillaged and destroyed
Russia.
The effect of the co-operation during the period of Russian Communist and Turkish
Nationalist revolutions had a positive effect on the other’s image, but it was short-lived and
limited in effect. Both nations continued to see each other as enemies in adversary ideological
camps and military alliances. Mutual perceptions began to change in the positive direction
only in the 1980s when Gorbachov’s policies increased transparency of the outer membrane
of the USSR, and peaked with the intensification of trade and tourism especially in the second
half of the 1990s.
For centuries, Russia had been perceived as the threat to Turkish security, territorial
integrity, independence and its very existence. However, especially after the Second World
War, Turkish political élite deliberately publicly downplayed the Russian threat, and chose
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smaller, and easier-to-swallow enemies such as Greece and Syria for itself. Despite the fact
that Turkey was in a military alliance, which was established directly to counter the Soviet
ambition over Europe, Turkish state rhetoric constantly directed the public opinion against
Greece, a military ally within NATO, rather than the actual adversary, the USSR. Although it
was the only NATO member bordering the Soviet Union, Turkey did not intend to formulate
an independent active foreign policy concerning relations with Moscow, the Soviet Caucasus
or Central Asia until the demise of the Soviets.
Turkey viewed the shrinkage of Russian power and the initial “power vacuum” in the
southern post-Soviet territory as an opportunity to assert its ambitions and implement new
policies in the region. In search for efficient adaptation to the new geopolitical structure
around Ankara had to alter its traditions in foreign policy making and conduct, define new
strategies and goals concerning the region, and get prepared for the inevitable rivalry with the
still-dominant power, Russia. Thus, Ankara did not loose time to stress its ethnic, historical,
and cultural ties with the NIS of the former Soviet south, and strengthened its claim for
greater influence in the region with its Western-style democratic regime, secular state system,
long-established market economy and the support garnered from the West. With the above-
stated characteristics, Turkey stood out as a more advantageous option as a post-Communist
model for the NIS.
Turkish foreign policy makers are still quite cautious though, as the country was not
prepared for such a radical change in the power balance. That is probably why Graham Fuller
believes that “Turkish foreign policy still is not a ‘full’ policy, as it is limited to its
horizons”16. For Russia, another contender for the throne of the former Union territory was
unacceptable, and Turkey’s steps towards such a role has strongly resented by the policy
makers in the Kremlin. Sergey Karaganov, councillor of the President of RF, stated in 1996:
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“These places are Russia’s backyard. Nobody can play in these fields without Russia’s
consent”.17 Russians implemented a through strategy to keep Turkey out of the borders of the
CIS, partly promoting the integration processes within the CIS, and partly showing the “stick”
to the still-cautious Turkey. With its greater mass and gravitational attraction, it became quite
easy for Moscow to keep its satellites in their orbits, though with some distortions in the
trajectories. To push Turkey out of the region, Russia also implemented power balancing
techniques, putting extra weight against Ankara’s scale,  using other actors with historical
animosities to Turkey: Armenia, Iran and Greece.
For Russia Turkey was not simply another state that challenges its hegemony in the
region, but it is the prolonged arm of NATO in the region. Moreover, Turkey is the only
member of NATO that is directly linked to the Soviet south with historical, cultural, religious
and linguistic ties, and has an deep-rooted experience over the ethno-cultural and political
structures of most of the region as its former ruler. The complexities originated from these
characteristics makes the scope of the Turkish-Russian relations broader than the term
“bilateral” would routinely suggest.18
4.2.3. The Basic Character of the Turkish-Russian Relations in the 1990s
The policies of the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation represented
opposites in regions where both claim to have important interests, such as the Caucasus, the
Balkan Peninsula and the South-west Asia, therefore each supported the possible
counterweights of the other’s policies. However, post-Soviet Turkish-Russian relations
displayed a pattern which both countries, despite their mutual perception of each other as
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formidable rivals in the region, formulate relatively benign policies and refrain from using
rhetoric reminding of the Cold War years. Although policies of the two countries openly
clashed in numerous issues, such as Karabağ, Caspian pipelines, CFE flank limits on the
Caucasus, persistent Russian military presence on Turkish borders, Chechnya, etc, Moscow
and Ankara were extremely cautious to prevent a spill-over of a tension in a single issue to the
whole of bilateral relations.  This tendency to isolate issues from each other kept the process
of normalisation of relations between two historical rivals on track, though occasional
aggravations observed. This character of ties was well displayed when Turkey and Russia
sided with opposing parties and coalitions during the Balkan Wars in Bosnia (1991-1995) and
Kosovo (1999), on the region which two countries fiercely competed for dominance for
centuries. However, this adversity on Balkan conflicts did not cause serious negative
repercussions on the rest of the bilateral issues between Turkey and Russia.
Sezer, within a similar approach, described the Turkish-Russian relations in the 1990s
by the term “virtual rapprochement”, which refers to “a state of bilateral relations in which
public manifestations of state-level adversity and hostility have nearly completely
disappeared; the importance of co-operation in a range of fields for furthering respective
national interests is mutually perceived and publicly articulated; governments desist from
using inflammatory rhetoric so as not to arouse public hostility; and officials keep the lines of
communication in order to safeguard relations against the impact of sudden crisis”19. In
Sezer’s model too, the historical mutual mistrust, fear and suspicion remains prompt besides
the urge of developing co-operation, in the decision makers’ minds, keeping the parties from
proceeding a higher level of rapprochement, which would be characterised by intensive co-
operation in the areas of security and economy.
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4.2.4. Boys with Toys: Clashing Interests in the Military-Security Level.
During the 1990s, and early 2000s, issues that brought competition and conflict
between Turkey and Russia, increased with a dazzling speed, keeping the sides in still
trenches despite the fact that more than a decade was left behind after the normalisation of
relations. The major manifestations of the competition between the two countries originated
from their conflicting interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and also in the Black Sea
region, the Balkans and South-western Asia are listed below.
One important source of tension was the issue of Russian arms sells to the Greek
Cypriots, when Russian arms export company Rosvooruzhenie made a deal with Nicosia on
purchase of S-30020 surface-to-air defence systems in 1997. Turkish Foreign Minister Çiller
bluntly stated that Turkey would hit the missiles if they were installed in the Southern Cyprus.
The crisis was cooled with Ankara’s success, as the Greek Cypriots decided not to proceed
with deployment in December 199821. During the crisis, Ankara skilfully directed the public
anger towards Greece and Greek Cypriot Government, keeping the Russian complicity at a
low profile, therefore preventing a possible escalation of tensions with Russia.
The Russian assistance to the Iranian nuclear programme, officially through the
construction of a nuclear plant in Bushehr, and transfer of medium-range missile technology
is quite disturbing for Turkey as well as Israel and the US. The ministry of foreign affairs and
military officials in Turkey, as well as their US counterparts frequently voiced Turkish
uneasiness about the Russia-Iran co-operation in various fields. Russia was also discontent
with the intensification of Turkish-Israeli co-operation particularly in the military-strategic
field since 1996. Appointment of the Middle-East expert Yevgeniy Primakov as the new
minister of foreign affairs and renewed Russian interest in the region under him was an
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67
important factor for Moscow’s concern about the possibility of disturbance of the regional
balances in the disadvantage of Russia's Arab and Iranian allies. Russia, for the first time in
several centuries, was marginalised as an actor in South-western Asian politics as it has been
deprived of contiguity with Turkey and Iran in the Caucasus and Afghanistan in Central
Asia22, but it was willing to reinstate its influence over the region. One possible way to do that
was obviously to counterpoise the Turkish and US support for Israel, by backing the Arab
states and Iran.
It is important that despite the international issues straining ties between the two
countries occasionally, economic relations remain unaffected; as in the growing trade
relations and energy deals (A characteristic which fits in the pattern of Turkish-Russian
relations elaborated in the previous section). Despite the shadow of Russian-Greek Cypriot S-
300 deal, frequent news about Duma members’ contacts with PKK and Russian appeal to the
Turkish Government for withdrawal of troops from northern Iraq, the Turkish-Russian natural
gas deal called the “Blue Stream” was closed during Chernomyrdin’s visit to Turkey in
December 1997, together with positive declarations of both sides on a possible strategic
partnership.23
Russian apprehension over the relative Turkish naval superiority in the Black Sea
because of the weakening of the Soviet BSF was also an important issue. For Russia, the
Black Sea has been a foreign policy and security priority, since its coast constituted the “soft
belly” of the defence system of the country, and naval dominance in the region was a
prerequisite for projecting power to the Mediterranean. Russia could claim to be a
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Mediterranean power, only it was a Black Sea power.24 The importance of the Black Sea was
also directly linked to the status of the Turkish Straits. 1936 Montreux Convention which
limited the movement of battleships of non-Black Sea littoral states into the Black Sea left the
Soviet Union as the main naval power in the region until 1991. However, after the dissolution
of the USSR and the consequent partitioning/diminishing of power of the BSF, Russian naval
power was reduced to an ordinary one, in the face of the strengthening Turkish, Romanian,
and Ukrainian presence.
4.2.5. Economic Relations and the Energy Connection
As Ivanov said, the economy and tourism are the real engines of Turkish-Russian
relations.25 The volume of trade between the two countries in 2000 reached the level of 4
billion USD. Adding this the shuttle trade (bavul ticareti), the sum makes a sufficiently high
level of trade.26 Turkey sells mainly consumer goods to Russia, while it buys gas in return. By
1997, Russia became the second largest trade partner of Turkey after Germany. Russian arms
manufacturers are also interested in the Turkish market, since Turkey, often frustrated by the
Western governments’ finicky attitude in weapon deals, seeks to diversify its sources. This
attitude was obvious after the cooling of the Turkey-EU relations following the EU
Luxembourg Summit of 12 December 1997, Turkey saw Russia as a possible partner in an
alternative alignment in Europe, and strategic co-operation.
One major instrument of developing economic relations was the Black Sea Economic
Co-operation (BSEC) initiative launched by Turkey in 1991, which formally targeted greater
co-operation mostly in the economic realm, trade, transportation, communications, plus the
preservation of the environment. It was initially designed as a unstructured gathering of the
                                                          
24 Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “The Changing Strategic Situation in the Black Sea Region”, Jahrbuch für
Internationale Sicherheitspolitk 2000, Sonderdruck aus: Erich Reiter, Hrsg., Mittler, Vienna, 2000, p. 498.
25 Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov at meeting with representatives
of Turkey’s business circles, Istanbul, 8 June 2001.
69
countries around the region, for flexibility and functionality, but gained a organisational form
with the declaration of BSEC Charter in the summer of 1998. Although its use failed to fulfil
the initial expectations of rapid of development of co-operation, it provided the embryonic
framework for intensification of economic, political and security relations. Besides this utility,
it also served as a medium that facilitates trade, which naturally became the main function of
the organisation.  Turkey, with its experience in democracy and free market economy, was fit
to assume the role of the locomotive of economic recovery and development in the region
through the BSEC, especially in certain fields such as transportation, communications,
construction,  and tourism.
Among all the elements of Turkish-Russian economic relations, the gas issue was
outstanding. While access to oil supply was not a pressing concern for Turkey, access to
natural gas certainly was.27 Gas transport requires pipelines, since shipping by tankers was not
a safe and feasible option. Turkey was the fastest growing gas market in Europe, with a
relative growth of difficulty of acquiring adequate gas.28 Its economic growth was being
artificially constrained because of the inadequacy of gas supply. Gas supply of the country
was mostly dependent on Russia, since mid-1980s, through the pipeline traversing Romania
and Bulgaria, plus import of liquid gas from Algeria and Nigeria. The gas deals with the
Soviet Union in 1986 and the Russian Federation in 1998 brought approximately 75% of the
current consumption to Turkey, and the ambitious “Blue Stream” project will double the
amount of gas from Russia. However, this project remained controversial, since majority of
the analysts suspect that it would be a strategic mistake to increase the dependency of Turkish
gas market on Russia. Turkey instead should diversify its options by turning to the other gas
producers in the region such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. Blue Stream trans-Black
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International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1, Fall 2000, p. 229.
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Sea gas pipeline, for twenty-five years, 365 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Analysts claim
that, since Russia has no preparation to transport gas from its own gas sources to the Blue-
Stream terminal in the Black Sea, it would re-export Turkmen gas to Turkey (with almost
tripling the price)29. Because of the preference of Russian connection over Turkmen option,
the deal causes tension between Turkey and Turkmenistan too. However, given the great need
of Turkish economy for gas, Turkish decision-makers could not afford to politicise the energy
issue.
Table 1: Existing and signed gas purchase agreements
Agreements Maximum
Gas (bcm)
Signature
date
Period Status
Russia (West) 6 1986 25 In operation
Russia (West) 8 1998 23 In operation
Russia (Blue Stream) 16 1997 25 Construction started
Iran 10 1996 22 Construction started
Turkmenistan 16 1999 30 Completed
Algeria (LNG) 4 1998 20 In operation
Nigeria (LNG) 1.2 1995 20 In operation
Total 61.2
Source: Botaş, 1999.30. (bcm: billion cubic metres, LNG: Liquid natural gas)
4.3. In the Backyard
After Moscow’s hegemonic control over the Caucasus and Central Asia seemed to
fade, Turkey had seen itself as the rightful inheritor of Russian influence in the Turkic states.
The new international order left Turkey with several “fraternal states” in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, and a group of smaller others which can also be a part of Ankara’s future
designs. Initially, as then Russian Ambassador to Ankara Albert Chernyshev stated, Russia
“acknowledged Turkey’s legitimate interest in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia in view of
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29 Şükrü Elekdağ, “Jeopolitik Körlük,” Milliyet, 25 October 1999.
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its political, economic and cultural ties with both regions.”31 Russia saw Turkey as a positive
example for the Muslims of the southern NIS and also the Russian Federation, as a modern
secular Western society, which rules out religious political assertiveness. Even after the
toughening of Russian attitude against Turkish ambitions towards the region in 1993,
Moscow’s perception of the Turkish model as a success story against the rise of political
Islam and related terrorist activity, remained unchanged. In the text of the Concept of Foreign
Policy  of 1993, this aspect of relations was voiced again:
“Relations with the Islamic countries of South and West Asia cannot be formed
without taking into account their policies in regard to the CIS states and regions of
Russia proper which are populated by Muslims, as well as the rivalry among them for
influence in nearby foreign countries. In this context, the search for ways of
differentiated interaction and cooperation with the countries of the countries of the
region takes on particular importance for Russia for purposes of preventing the spread
of fundamentalist Islamic tendencies to us and affirming the ideas of secularism in our
Muslim nearby foreign countries.
Of priority importance for Russia in this respect is Turkey, which being also a member
of NATO, is more receptive to Western values Friendly relations with Turkey are
important to us, both for having good prospects for mutual benefit from trade and
economic relations, and for exerting a possible positive influence on Russia’s southern
Commonwealth neighbours in the matter of formulating a civil society here.”32
Initially Turkey’s role was positively perceived by all the post-Soviet states. Turkey
became the first country to recognise the independence of the NIS, establish diplomatic ties
and open embassies in their capitals. Especially for the Caucasian and Central Asians with
common ethnic, cultural, religious, historical and linguistic ties, Turkey became the initial
role model.  Cultural, and economic interaction rocketed in 1991 and 1992, and a special
channel of the Turkish state television, TRT Avrasya (Eurasia) began to be received in the
region in the summer of 1992. Turkey acted as spokesman for the Central Asian and
Caucasian Turkic states in the international fora, and canalised its efforts for their economic
recovery. As President Demirel stated, Turkish policy concerning the NIS [was and is] to help
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these states to “seal their independence and become integrated into the international
community.”33
Presumably, because of the proximity and common immediate needs of the two
powers, Turkish and Russian spheres of influence intersected after a short while. The policy
turn in Russia from relative Western orientation to renewal of vital interests in the former
Soviet space in the period of 1992-1993 brought the regional rivalry, which would persist
throughout the decade.
While both Turkey and Russia are open to limitless co-operation in their bilateral
relations, each country’s grand strategies concerning the Caucasus and Central Asia
reciprocally exclusionary in nature, that is, neither was eager to share the benefits. Both
countries aim to push each other’s pieces out of the chessboard. Especially for Russia, with its
persistent claims for special rights in the former Soviet south, this attitude is more obvious
and has been demonstrated by frequent muscle flexing. Excluding external powers from the
“near abroad” is one of the most important factors Moscow believes to facilitate the re-
integration of the post-Soviet space. By leaving little room to manoeuvre for rivals, Russia
would be unrivalled for the leadership role of the CIS community, in very field, since its
military, economic and strategic capabilities overpower each and every member state.
Turkey also adopted a policy against Russia with a genuine exclusionary nature, since
Ankara presumed that the longer and more effectively the Russian drive of Moscow-centred
integration could be countered, the bigger chance for the NIS to consolidate their
independence and integrate into the world community. The natural outcome of this policy
would be the strengthening of Turkey’s relations with its “brothers” in the post-Soviet south.
4.3.1. Barricading the Iron Gate: Turkish Policy towards the Southern Caucasus
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The Caucasus had been one of the most worn away stages of world history, having
been the battle ground for clashing civilisations and breeding field of unrest and hostility
rooted in its nature of impermeably cosmopolite ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. It is
an active fault line between the major plates of Iranian, Slavic, Turkish civilisations, their
centuries old imperial formations, and supra-civilisations of Christianity and Islam, keeping
them detached from each other. The political situation, which is always close to the level of
boiling point in the region and the roots of the hostilities keeping everyone around on toes,
goes centuries back in history. The artificial sub-national fragmentation of peoples by Stalin
adds to the current tensions.34 Today, unlike the recent past of tribal anarchy, the balances of
the region are less volatile, with several countries more or less established their state
structures; the Russian Federation in the north, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in the south.
Still under a variety of conflicting internal and external pressures, the unresolved ethnic and
territorial disputes continued to frequently surface, and this contributed to the Russian efforts
to bind the southern trio to itself in a short time of several years.
The epicentre of the Turkish-Russian competition is the Caucasus, or the southern
Caucasus to be more precise. Both Turkey and Russia became highly suspicious of each
other’s ambitions and actions in the region, especially after 1992-1993. In the southern tier of
the former Soviet Union, Southern Caucasus was of greater priority for Russia then Central
Asia, with the exception of Kazakstan.35 The withdrawal of Russian military and political
power from the region following the Union’s dissolution, gave rise to the “power vacuum”
question in the minds of the Russian political élite, who immediately look for a design for re-
establishing presence there in order to prevent external global and regional powers, namely
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the US, Turkey or Iran, take over the influential position.36 Russia perceived Turkey as a
power trying to organise a “strong opposition against Russia in the Caucasus, the Caspian
region and Central Asia in order to realise the realise the ideal of pan-Turkism.”37 It viewed
the civil strife in Georgia, Karabağ conflict and historical Armenian apprehension of Turkey
as opportunities to be manipulated in order to squeeze out Turkish influence from the region,
by excluding it from the peacemaking and peacekeeping processes. Turkish policymaking
élite is acutely aware of the fact that although Turkey is powerful enough for a rivalry with
Russia over the NIS, especially in the Caucasus, it is not capable of an all-out confrontation38.
Thus, Ankara is unwilling to confront Russia, but is an effective spoiler to Russia’s ambitions
in the South Caucasus.
The Caucasus is not an ordinary region in the surroundings. Turkey has social and
cultural ties with the Caucasian states as a result of centuries of interaction. Aware of the
possible economic and strategic benefits the region promises, Turkey’s aim was to establish
peace, stability and co-operation in the region for the good of all. Turkish foreign ministry
lists its main objectives as; establishing comprehensive co-operation in the region with the
contribution of all three states, namely Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia; assuring the
consolidation of their independence; achieving peaceful solutions for ethnic conflicts; and
establishing and maintaining the political stability and economic well-being of these states.
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For this purpose, the Republic of Turkey “immediately recognised the independence of the
Caucasian countries without any discrimination”39.
Turkish foreign policy could be investigated best through accounts on bilateral
relations with each state, by paying special attention to the main issues determining the
relations between the Caucasian states and their relations with Turkey, and of course, with
Russia.
4.3.1.1. Azerbaijan as the Centre of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Southern Caucasus
Azerbaijan can be named as the main focus of the Turkish foreign policy, despite the
official equidistance to all Caucasian states, since Turkey and Azerbaijan have common
language, culture and history. Azerbaijan, together with the Crimea and the Volga-Ural
region, was one of the most important cradles of Turkish national movement in late 19th and
early 20th centuries. The sense of brotherhood was more real and deep rooted here compared
to the Central Asian states. The closeness of the spoken languages in both countries was also
an important factor to contribute the strengthening of ties between two peoples. The
importance both countries attribute to each other is substantial. Azerbaijan sees Turkey as a
perfect model for development and transformation, and a counterbalance to the Russian
pressure, while Ankara considers Azerbaijan “the most strategically located Turkic state: a
gateway to Central Asia, a potential economic partner with huge petroleum resources, and a
natural ally in containing Russian influence” in the Southern Caucasus”40.
Azerbaijan declared its independence on August 30, 1991, and this declaration was
adopted by the Azerbaijani Parliament on October 18, 1991. Turkey, still being under the
shock of the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and continuing tradition of caution in
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foreign policy, did not react quickly enough to recognise Azerbaijani independence. Still,
Turkey was first to recognise the Republic of Azerbaijan  on 9 November 1991, 2.5 months
after the declaration of independence, but almost a month before all other NIS. Two countries
established diplomatic relations on 14 January 1992.
Early political developments favoured Turkey, as the staunchly pro-Turkish leader of
the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), Ebulfez Elçibey was elected president of the republic
with a %60 support in 1992 elections. Elçibey, who declared himself as a “soldier of
Atatürk”, stated several times that he is willing and ready to accept a federation with
Turkey41. Russian influence was rapidly diminishing as the parliament unanimously voted
against membership to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on October 1992.. For
the time being, Turkey seemed to have the upper hand.
Despite his positive image as a Azerbaijani and “Turkish” nationalist, both in
Azerbaijan and Turkey, Elçibey was perceived as a naive and inexperienced politician even in
his own country.42 His pro-Turkishness without limits was disturbing even for Turkey as it
could lead to frictions with Iran and Russia.43 Self-declared partiality for the Turkish model,
anti-Russian views and long-term goal of uniting the Iran Azerbaijani’s under Greater
Azerbaijan facilitated a political alliance between Russia, Armenia and Iran, to counterpoise
Turkish-Azerbaijani axis, and invited the decisive intervention against his leadership.
The blow to the Turkish influence in Azerbaijan came with the coup of Suret
Hüseyinov in June 1993. Equipped with the heavy weapons left by the Soviet troops of
General Shcherbak and aided by his military advisors, Hüseyinov easily seized the power.
Former KGB and Politburo member Haydar Aliyev became the president, and Hüseyinov
appointed as the Prime Minister. New President Aliyev acted quite pro-Russian and reversed
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many Turkish achievements in favour of the Russians after his seizure of power. He agreed to
join the CIS, cancelled the oil deal with Turkey, and then renegotiated the agreement to
include Russia (LUKoil) in the Azerbaijan International Operating Company’s Caspian oil
exploitation project, transferring %10 of Baku’s own shares to Russia in March 1994.44 Baku
ordered Turkish citizens to seek visas to enter Azerbaijan and about 1600 military experts
serving in the training of the Azerbaijani army were dismissed. During this process, Turkey
could only watch what was happening, and could not intervene or manipulate the situation,
partly because of the continuation of its traditional cautious policy towards Russia and partly
its lack of experience in such matters. By the ousting of Elçibey, Turkey lost a very important
opportunity of consolidating influence in Azerbaijan.
Thanks to the tacit Russian support given to Armenians in the Karabağ conflict,
Azerbaijan did not directly fell in the orbit of Russia. As Aliyev matured in his seat,
Azerbaijani policy became more and more realistic and balanced, according to which he
refrained from granting a special place to any of the big rivals in pursuit of greater influence,
Turkey and Russia.. On 28-29 December 1993, on the visit of Azerbaijani Foreign Minister
Hasan Hasanov, Turkey’s right to intervene as a guarantor state to Nahçevan originated from
the Treaty of Kars of 1921, was brought up, presumably to intimidate Russia.  Again, on 8-11
February 1994, Aliyev visited Turkey with a crowded delegation, and he jointly stated with
Turkish President Süleyman Demirel that Turkey and Azerbaijan were “one nation, two
states”45. Two leaders came together again on 5 May 1994, after the signing of the Partnership
for Peace Agreement by NATO and CIS countries, to discuss future political and military
strategies.
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Re-strengthening Turkish-Azerbaijani relations barely survived a scandal in 1995. In
17 March 1995, a coup d’état attempted by Ruşen Cevadov against Aliyev’s leadership in
Azerbaijan. After a short while, Turkish involvement in the attempt through the National
Intelligence Organisation (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı - MİT), and several cabinet ministers was
reported in the Turkish media, but the link was officially denied by the Çiller government.
However, this incident shadowed Çiller’s visit to Baku, which took place about a month later.
Interestingly, the scandal did not have medium or long-term effect on the general bilateral
relations, possibly because of the mutual understanding that tension would be fatal for the
common interests of the two countries in the region. Aliyev, proving that he is a very
pragmatic and able statesman in balance politics, kept good relations with Turkey.
Turkey’s officially declared objectives concerning the Republic of Azerbaijan were
three-fold; Firstly, Turkey aimed to assure the consolidation of the independence of the
Republic of Azerbaijan. Although the conflicts in the region allowed Russia to increase its
influence at first, the independence of the Caucasian republics seemed to be consolidated46.
Secondly, Turkey gave ultimate importance to the protection of territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan. It was the main champion of the promotion of Azerbaijani views on the Karabağ
issue in all international fora. Thirdly, Turkey pursues a policy of diplomatic and technical
assistance for realisation of Azerbaijan’s economic potential by exploitation of rich natural
resources of the Caspian region. To achieve these aims, two countries signed more than 100
bilateral agreements between 1991-1999. Another undeclared but obvious objective of Turkey
is to keep the Azerbaijani administration friendly (but not necessarily pan-Turkish) to
Ankara.47
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4.3.1.1.1.  Mountainous Karabağ Conflict
The conflict over the Mountainous Karabağ initiated in 1988, as the Armenian
majority living in the autonomous region voted for seceding from Azerbaijan. Karabağ
Armenians and para-military forces from Armenia occupied approximately 20% of the
Azerbaijani territory after a bloody war. It was really hard to stay neutral for Turkey in a
dispute concerning their kin, the Azerbaijanis, and the historical enemies, the Armenians.
Public opinion immediately turned in favour of the Azerbaijani side, and the international
dispute became an internal issue of Turkey.
Neither the public support for pro-Azerbaijani policies, nor the political will of the
government proved adequate for an effective action in the international arena and Turkish
support for Azerbaijan remained verbal.  Four factors prevented Turkey to exert enough
pressure on the Armenians: Firstly, the domestic political situation was chaotic, and Turkey
had its own internal problems (i.e. the Kurdish insurrection) to deal with. Secondly, there was
no significant support from the West thanks to the lobbying activities of the Armenian
Diaspora mainly in the US and France. Thirdly, NATO was reluctant to get involved in an
unstable and volatile region. Finally, and probably the most important of all, Russia was still
powerful in the region. After a short period of internal chaos Russia adopted the doctrine of
“Near Abroad” implying re-establishing Russian influence in the CIS.48 Russian ambassador
in Ankara, Albert Chernyshev quite clearly illustrated this fact when Turkey succeeded in
securing a UNSC resolution urging Armenian troops to withdraw, saying: “some people think
that Turkey should fill a vacuum... There is no vacuum. Russia has considerable historical,
economic and political interests in this region”49. Russia also paid substantial importance to
its relations to Iran, despite its negative rhetoric on Islamic terror, because of its potential as a
counterbalance to growing Turkish influence in the former Soviet south. While strictly
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opposing most of the Turkish policies and stances concerning the region, Moscow has been
supportive to Iran’s prospects, welcoming it for mediation in the Karabağ conflict and
resolutely carrying out the nuclear assistance to Tehran.
During the period of 1992-1993, Turkish attitude towards Armenia was quite warlike,
mostly because the conflict was spilled over into internal politics. As the news of massacres
and ethnic cleansing kept coming, the Turkish public became more and more eager to support
a military intervention. Turkey also had a legal responsibility over Azerbaijan, since it is one
of the guarantor states for the autonomous republic of Nahçevan, according to the  Kars
Treaty signed between Turkey and the Soviet Union on 16 March 1921. President Özal
publicly threatened Armenia. On 2 March 1992, Turkey began to oblige cargo planes directed
to Armenia to land in Turkish airfields, for a thorough check for arms.50 Turkey’s attitude got
harsher as the Chief of General Staff, General Doğan Güreş declared that he is ready to supply
the Azerbaijani Army  with Turkish troops in June 199451. But no action followed the
rhetoric, as Russian Defence Minister Grachov reacted quickly saying that Russia would not
permit interference by Turkish troops, adding that “Russia has its own interests in
Azerbaijan”52 while the Commander-in-chief of Joint CIS armed forces, Marshall Yevgeniy
Shaposhnikov talked about the possibility of third world war and reminded Turkey the “risks”
involved53.
Turkish attitude towards Armenia and particularly the Mountainous Karabağ dispute
softened after Demirel replaced Özal as president. Turkish officials concentrated on the
diplomatic efforts to promote Azerbaijan’s views in the international fora, and refrained to use
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too nationalistic rhetoric against Armenia. Furthermore, Turkey provided humanitarian aid to
Armenia for a brief period in expense of the Azerbaijani trust. Turkish Foreign Ministry
launched a diplomatic offensive on the side of Azerbaijan in order to prevent Iran to act as a
mediator in the Karabağ process. Ankara took the issue to the United Nations Security
Council on 17 August 1993, and secured four resolutions urging immediate, complete and
unconditional withdrawal of Armenian Forces from the occupied territories54. Turkey also
used the summit of Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO)55 to condemn Armenia, in its
Istanbul summit in July 1993. The efforts of the Turkish diplomats, especially Foreign
Minister Hikmet Çetin’s shuttle diplomacy to the region and European capitals became
instrumental in bringing the issue to the agenda of CSCE.56 This time, in order to balance
Russian mediation efforts, on 28 February 1992, Turkey urged CSCE in Prague meeting to
confirm that Karabağ is an indivisible part of Azerbaijan57. It also played an important role of
organising the Minsk Group under OSCE in June 1992 with the major aim of mediating
between the parties of the Caucasian conflicts and search ways for peaceful settlement.
Finally, in April 1994, a cease fire agreement is signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia as a
temporary solution.
In the 1994 CSCE Summit in Budapest, Russia yielded to the international pressure to
station a Finnish-led multinational peacekeeping force of 3000 strength under the aegis of the
UN, in Karabağ to facilitate the peace process. However, this idea seems to be shelved since,
as no concrete effort to realise this decision was made. According to the analysts Halbach and
Tiller, initial Russian acceptance of this force in its backyard can be explained by Moscow’s
ephemeral prediction that the collapse of the Azerbaijani forces against the Armenian
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occupation forces after 1992, could not be in Russia’s interests, since it eliminated the balance
of power in the southern Caucasus and invited the risk of a Turkish military intervention in
Azerbaijan’s favour.58 Russian assertive position quickly restored after this short break as
Russia strictly opposed the stationing of peacekeeping forces of other (non-ex-Soviet)
countries in its “near abroad” the next year. Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated in 1995 that no
country could take upon itself the special role, which belonged to Russia in ensuring stability
in this enormous region, or create a sphere of influence there by excluding Russia.59
The only country that constantly expressed its support for Azerbaijan was Turkey. In
all international fora, Ankara promoted Baku’s view of the Karabağ conflict, and became the
main obstacle before the possible domination of pro-Armenian perspective. Turkey also set a
joint embargo with Azerbaijan against Armenia. Turkish military assistance, technical support
and arms supplies was not a secret for careful eyes during the war. Currently, stalemate
persists. Approximately 20% of the Azerbaijani territory is still under Armenian occupation.
Thanks to Turkish efforts, all members of the OSCE -except Armenia- respect the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan, and UN has the similar position. Turkey still supports the bilateral
talks between the two parties in search for a pacific solution, and maintains the precondition
of the withdrawal of Armenian forces for establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia.
4.3.1.1.2. Pipelining the Competition
The substantial oil and natural gas wealth of Azerbaijan and Kazakstan were already
attracting interest in the region before the break up of the SU. The struggle to get the lion’s
share from the Caspian reserves got harsher after the independence of the above stated states.
Turkey’s ambition to secure a share in the anticipated revenue from the Caspian fossil fuel
reservoirs and the benefits can be gathered from their transportation to the world markets
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became one of the major foci of rivalry with Russia. Especially after 1993-1994, the main
emphasis of the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations too, shifted towards the oil issues after the
signing of the cease fire agreement in 1994.
When he came to power, Elçibey signed the first pipeline agreement with Turkey in
March 1993, agreeing the transportation of the Caspian oil by a pipeline traversing Georgia
and Turkey. Russian Federation rejected the deal on the pipeline project that would neglect its
interests. Azerbaijan was the “historical” petroleum source of Russia and Soviet Union, and
should not be let go. President’s councillor Sergey Karaganov stated in 1997: “You can have
Azerbaijan, but the oil is ours!”60
As the June 1993 coup changed the leadership and political orientation in Azerbaijan,
new President Aliyev changed the plans for transport in favour of Russia. Aliyev gave
concessions to the Russians to ensure their “neutrality” in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict,
and so he did. Russian Petroleum Company LUKoil promised 10% of the production of three
main reservoirs. Turkish response was to “stop the Russians” on the Bosphorus; Turkish
Ministry of Transport and Turkish Pipeline Company BOTAŞ, jointly prepared a “Straits
Report” in April 1994, after the tanker accident near Istanbul on 14 March 1994. Turkey
declared that new regulations for the Turkish Straits, modifying the Montreux Convention on
the Straits would be on force starting from 1 July 1994. International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) approved the new regulations on 25 May 1994. Presumably, Russia perceived the
promulgation of the new Turkish regulations regarding the naval traffic through the Straits
and the Sea of Marmara as a deliberate attempt to undermine the Russian pipeline alternative
of Baku-Novorossiysk and accused Turkey of unilaterally violating the Montreux Convention
of 1936. After a period of teeth gnashing on the both sides, on 6 November 1998, Turkey
revised the regulations of 1994, softening some provisions about the vessel sizes, which were
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said to be designed initially for a trade-off. Russia grudgingly accepted the revised regulations
and diplomatic skirmish remained minor, but retaliated with another project.  In order to by-
pass the Turkish Straits and nullify the affect of 1994 regulations imposed by Turkey,
Moscow engineered the idea of a Trans-Balkan pipeline project, from the Bulgarian port of
Burgas to the Greek port of Alexandropolis.
Particularly after the frustration of the attempt of enticing the Turkic states into close
co-operation around itself, the pipeline issue became the core of Turkish policy. The rivalry
for the pipelines became the main determinant of Turkish influence in the region, and a
chance to save its weakened prestige from total failure. Turkish ambitions over the energy
routes were also fed by its domestic market’s immediate needs and the pressure from its
Western allies, especially the US. US support was the only major support behind Turkey in its
efforts to link Caspian hydrocarbon states to the port of Ceyhan. The reasoning behind this
support was the fact that the “Turkish route would reduce Europe’s vulnerability to cut-
offs”61.
The delay in the realisation of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project lessened its chances
against the rivalling projects. In October 1995, Azerbaijan and AIOC decided that the early
oil from the Çırağ oil reservoir, would be transported through the present Baku-Novorossiysk
line and it has been flowing through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline since the Autumn of
1997. Furthermore, Georgia and Azerbaijan agreed on another line between Baku and the
Georgian port of Supsa. Although the Turkish government supported the construction of
Baku-Supsa line, on the grounds that its first section would eventually form a part of the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, Hayrettin Uzun, the head of BOTAŞ, stated that the support for the
Baku-Supsa line was an error, and Turkey should concentrate only on the Baku-Ceyhan
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route.62 Another competitor in the energy corridor was the Caspian Pipeline Consortium
(CPC) project of a pipeline that would transport Kazak Tengiz oil to the Russian Black Sea
coast. By this line Russia plans to play Kazak oil against the Azerbaijani alternative and
diminish the chances for the construction of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.63 The CPC plans to build
a line between Makhachkale and Novorossiysk, which will avoid the insecure Chechen
territory. As the pendulum swings freely to and fro, the pipeline routes still are not determined
by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC). But, realising that the chances
of winning are very low, Turkey has come to agree with the principle of multiple pipelines
that oil can be delivered through Russia as well as Turkey64. Moreover, Russian policy is
displaying “a new vigour and coherence in the wake of its brutal and unfinished victory in
Chechnya” and the election of Putin as president. Therefore, Turkey no longer has the
initiative in the Caucasian politics, and its policy was reduced to reacting against the actions
of Russia, the US or the three states of the region, especially on the pipeline issue.65
Similar to Russia66, Turkey is also hardly a single actor in the energy field. A number
of key actors has a say so in Turkish foreign policy mechanism, including the Foreign
Ministry, Ministry of Energy and Natural Sources, The Prime Ministry, Turkish Petroleum
Corporation (TPAO)67, Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ), and several colossal construction
companies which are very likely to be involved in the construction of the pipelines and
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auxiliary facilities. Since the number of actors is quite high, friction among them is inevitable.
The most important disagreement in policy conduct, occurred in March 1998, when the
foreign ministry invited the representatives of the states concerned with the Caspian pipelines
in Istanbul, except the Russian Federation. The Ministry of Energy protested the foreign
ministry’s exclusion of Russia, on the grounds that this action gave damaged the Turkish-
Russian energy officials’ negotiations over the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline issue.68
It is also claimed that a strong “Russian lobby” is formed close to the administration
by the large construction companies and other businessmen with important trade relations
with Russia. The commentators claim that these companies have important volume of
investments in Russia, and would play a role of promoting Russian interests in Ankara to
ensure the safety of their enterprises.69 It has been suggested that the Blue Stream project,
which had been intensely criticised by analysts in Turkey, was realised under the pressure of
this Russian lobby.
4.2.1.2. Georgia
The importance of Georgia for Turkey is its geopolitical location, its being the main
land link between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Central Asia. It is the key for Turkey’s objectives
about the land transport, oil and natural gas pipelines bypassing Armenia. It is also a buffer
zone between the Russian Federation and Turkey. Being aware of its significance, Turkey,
starting from recognition of the independence of the Republic of Georgia in November 1991,
aimed the preservation and maintenance of the existing friendly relations with its new
neighbour and provided economic and political support. By 1999, Turkey replaced Russia as
the main trading partner of Georgia.
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Georgia was also particularly important for stronger Russian presence in the Black
Sea. As Grachov stated in 1993, Russia should take every measure to ensure its troops would
remain in Georgia, otherwise, it would loose the Black Sea.70 Mainly because of this strategic
significance, Georgia is another source of ethnic conflicts. First the rebellion in Southern
Ossetia started in 1989, and then the Abkhazian autonomous region revolted against Tbilisi.
The Abkhazians, equipped and manned by the Russians, drove out all the Georgians out of
the Abkhazian territory, after a fierce and bloody fighting. Today, Georgia is a dismembered
state, with the practically independent regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the north,
and highly autonomous republic of Ajaria to the south (which is under the control of a
wealthy overlord, Aslan Abashidze). Another threat lies in the ethnic Armenian region of
Javakhetia, along the border of Armenia and Turkey.
During the conflict in Abkhazia, Turkey had preferred to remain neutral71, although
the public opinion in Turkey was in favour of the Abkhazians, thanks to the formidable
Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey. Turkey sent relief shipments to the Abkhazians, but only
through the Russian and Georgian territory to ensure maximum control over the cargo.72
When the Abkhaz President Vladislav Ardzinba visited Turkey several times in 1992-1993,
no officials openly received him, but public support for him was asserted. According to the
evaluation of Henze, Turkish policy towards Georgia was successful during the period of civil
war; it was silent but supportive73.
The main objective of Turkey in this struggle is the preservation of the territorial
integrity of the Republic of Georgia and the resolution of the conflict by peaceful means. It
sent humanitarian aid for both Georgians and Abkhazians, contributed to the United Nations
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Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) with five military observers starting from 21
October 1994, and supported dialogue between the adversaries. For realising this purpose, it
held a conference in Istanbul on 7-9 June 1999 to bring the parties together.
Georgia currently hosts four Russian military bases, two of which are to be evacuated
soon. Russia agreed to withdraw its troops from Gudauta (50th) base in Abkhazia and Vaziani
(137th) military airfield near Tbilisi by the end of August 2001. Negotiations for renewal of
lease of the two remaining bases, one in Akhalkalaki (62nd) , in Javakhetia, and the other in
Batumi (12th), Ajaria. It is a well-known secret that for both of these bases, troops are
recruited largely from the local population, giving these minorities an important advantage
against the capital. Against the Georgian will to get rid of these remaining bases within three
years, Moscow claims that it is impossible to vacate them for the next fifteen years, because
of economic shortcomings.
Ankara saw Georgia as a possible ally since the two countries shared the desire to
resist Russian influence in the region. High-level officers’ visits exchanged, and the frequent
Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia summits intensified the understanding and co-operation among
the three countries, and brought them closer. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan refused to renew
the CIS Collective Security Treaty in May 1999.  Like Azerbaijan, Georgia too has pro-
NATO leanings because of the frustration of Russian involvement of the secessionist
movements within its territory. Shevardnadze’s frequent pledges that Georgia will seek
NATO membership in 2005, has become a major issue of contention between Moscow and
Tbilisi, and a factor contributing to the Russian fear of a Turkish-Georgian-Azerbaijani
military bloc against Russia and its allies. Georgia has stated that, within the framework of the
PfP, it is ready to permit NATO to use its airfields, training areas and ports.74 Georgia sees
Turkey, a powerful regional actor and a NATO member, as the most important factor to
reduce its dependence to Moscow.
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4.2.1.3. Armenia
It was the Armenian community (millet) which was called as the "loyal people"
(Millet-i Sadıka) by the Ottomans almost a century ago. What changed the relationship
between these two peoples was the infamous deportation of the Armenians by the Ottoman
administration during the First World War. Ever since that tragic point of history, Turko-
Armenian relations never became as friendly as it was in the previous century again. In fact,
despite the rhetoric about the so-called genocide, and the killings of tens of Turkish diplomats
by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) between 1974-1985,
Turkey never approached Armenia with a significant negative prejudice in the international
arena. Turkish policy was -and still is- cautious and balanced towards Armenia.75
Turkey recognised the independence of the Republic of Armenia on 16 December
1991 together with all the NIS countries (except Azerbaijan, which was recognised almost a
month before), as it was stated, “without discrimination”. It sought to assist Armenia too, to
consolidate its independence and to be integrated in the global economy. Even before he final
demise of the USSR in August, Turkish ambassador to Moscow visited Armenia and prepared
the draft of a friendship agreement together with some bilateral conventions regulating border
trade in April 1991. Turkey also extracted humanitarian aid, and facilitated the transit of other
states’ aid to Armenia despite the fact that it was applying an embargo to it together with
Azerbaijan. It was also Turkey who invited Armenia to be a founding state in the BSEC.
Ankara has not established full diplomatic relations with Yerevan partly because of its
ongoing occupation of more than 20% of Azerbaijani soil, but also because the Armenian
government refused to recognise the 1921 Kars agreement signed between Turkey and Soviet
Union, thus not recognising the borders with Turkey. For normalisation of the relations,
Turkey’s precondition presented to Armenia was to withdraw from Azerbaijan and to apply
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pressure on the ethnic Armenian militia in Karabağ to obey Baku76.  Turkey perceives
Mountainous  Karabağ as “an integral part of Azerbaijan and urges for the withdrawal of
Armenian troops from occupied Azerbaijani territory. Turkey considers the OSCE Minsk
Group process, to which it is a party, to be an important mechanism for finding a peaceful
solution to the conflict”77 Once the precondition is satisfied, relations between all the
Caucasian states will be normalised together with the Turkish-Armenian relations as Turkey
has political will to develop relations and co-operation.
Initially, Turkey tried not to ignore Armenia altogether as a trade partner, despite the
tension caused by the Karabağ conflict. In September 1992, Turkey decided to sell 100,000
tons of grain to Armenia thus effectively broke the Azerbaijani blockade.78 In November
1992, Ankara and Yerevan signed an energy protocol, according to which Turkey agreed to
sell 300 million kilowatts of electricity per year to Armenia. The deal made the Azerbaijanis
furious and the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Tevfik Kasımov denounced the accord as a “stab
in the back of Azerbaijan.”79 Alerted by the risk of tension with Baku, Ankara cancelled the
energy protocol before it took effect, and Erdal İnönü, the deputy prime minister of Turkey,
made a hastily arranged visit to Baku to assure the Azerbaijani administration that Azerbaijan
has the priority position in Turkish foreign policy, and that implementation of the energy
accord would be contingent to Armenian withdrawal from occupied territory.80 Officially
there is no trade between Turkey and Armenia today, however, up to 150 million USD worth
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of Turkish consumer goods enter Armenia through the Russian Federation and Georgia,
bypassing the Turkish-Azerbaijani embargo.81
Armenia, being landlocked, mountainous, short of mineral resources and mostly
devastated by the earthquake of 1988, cannot live without foreign assistance. The economic
situation is even more worsened with the joint Turkish-Azerbaijani embargo, which
exacerbated the energy and trade deficit of the country. Without a peace satisfactory for all
the parties of the Karabağ conflict, Armenian position would not be better off in the near
future. Armenia needs Azerbaijan for energy and Turkey for trade. Almost half of the energy
need of Armenian SSR was supplied by  Azerbaijan in the Soviet period. Normalisation of the
economic relations with Turkey is also vital for the Armenians since Anatolia and Armenia
are economically complementary82. Armenian leadership is also aware of this necessity, and
they tried to convince Turkey to separate diplomatic and economic relations between the two
countries for a couple of times. The former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s chief
advisor Jirair Libaridyan asked for that sort of separation of Mountainous Karabağ issue from
relations in other fields, during his visit to Ankara in  September 1996. Turkey refused the
offer immediately and persisted on the embargo. Even the current president, the nationalist
Kocharyan refrained from using traditional antagonistic Armenian rhetoric against Turkey.
For Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan were the most important threats to the county’s
security. The need for balancing the Turkish threat, forced Yerevan into an inner orbit of
Russia, giving Moscow greater chance of manipulation of the Caucasian issues through
Armenia. It frequently protested Turkey for giving technical and tactical assistance to the
Azerbaijani Army, directly or indirectly, during the war in Karabağ and surroundings. Since
Armenia could not survive without Russian military and economic assistance, it pursued a
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balancing policy against the Turkish-Azerbaijani axis, finally reducing itself to a puppet of
Kremlin leadership’s strategy in the region. In 1994, Yerevan accepted the establishment of
two permanent Russian military bases within its territory, in Yerevan and Gyumri, and
stationing of two Russian divisions to guard the Turkish-Armenian border83. In early January
1999 Russia announced that it would deploy S-300 missiles in its bases in Armenia. Yerevan
also purchased 8 Chinese Typhoon multiple missile launchers in September 1999, to deploy
on the Azerbaijani and Turkish borders.
4.3.1.4. The disagreement on the CFE Treaty
 Russia refuses to comply with the limits ordered by CFE treaty for the North
Caucasus flank zone, and this non-compliance constitutes a major problematic between
Ankara and Moscow, since Russia proposed that the CFE’s NATO members and East
European signatories abolish or re-arrange the ceiling constraints in October 1993.84 The
Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachov was reported to have said that if NATO expands too
rapidly to the East, Russia will tear up the CFE Treaty. Vladimir Lukin agreed with Grachov,
saying that it would be very difficult to explain to people in Russia that the country should
continue to disarm under CFE and START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) under these
conditions.85 Russia reorganised its North Caucasian Military District (NCMD) in 1995, to
deal better with the war in Chechnya and declared in April 1995 that it would ignore the
ceiling in the Caucasus region of the CFE Treaty.
In the First Review Conference held on 15-31 May 1996, other signatories granted
Russia a three-year period to comply with the limits in the North Caucasus. Additionally, the
conference redefined the Northern Caucasus flank zone, providing Russia with the
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opportunity to maintain same amount of military force in a smaller area.86  Russia did not
comply with the limits until the end of the term and insisted on its complains about the treaty.
During the OSCE Istanbul Summit, when the revised treaty was signed on 19 November
1999, Russia admitted its breaches of CFE ceilings and assured the leaders of the signatory
states that weapons in the North Caucasus will be restricted at the end of the operation in
Chechnya.87
The NIS in the Southern Caucasus are not capable of posing a military threat to
Russia, given their shattered economic situations and weakness of self-occupied premature
armies. The spread of Islamic irredentism in the Northern Caucasus is also proved to be
impossible since the Chechen incursion is contained in the highlands. As the above
possibilities are eliminated, Russian military strategists has been left with Turkey as the only
major threat to the security of the country. Thus, the main elements of Russian southern
Caucasus policy are determined as reinforcing southern CIS border adjoining Turkey, and
keeping Turkey out of the area by every means possible.88 To guarantee a dominant role in the
“near abroad”, Russia needed to establish a network of military bases89 throughout the former
Soviet Union. On 6 April 1994, Yeltsin issued a decree setting out plans for 30 bases in the
CIS90. It succeeded substantially in this task especially in Georgia and Armenia, where Russia
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was granted with several military bases91 and the right to station border troops on the Turkish
frontier. It also established military installations and stationed troops exceeding the limits,
which were stipulated by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), for the North
Caucasus flank zone.92
4.3.1.5. Living in Glass Houses: Chechnya and the PKK
Since Russia ethnically is a Russian-Turkic and Orthodox-Muslim country, Moscow
has been very touchy about the possibility of national or religious secessionist movements,
especially while its federative structure was rather unstable in the initial stage of its
independence.93 Turkish attempts to inject influence in the Turkish/Muslim parts of the
Federation and CIS, brought back the historical fear of Pan-Turkism, and increased the
Russian resentment and suspicion for the Turkish initiatives concerning the region.  Many
members of the Russian political élite became sure that the ultimate Turkish goal is to ease
the break up of the Federation and gather the Turkish and Muslim pieces under the “Turan”,
the mythological pan-Turkish empire. Most of them believed that this grand strategy was
initiated when the secessionist rebellion in Chechnya began.
Turkey was equally irritated by the covert political and material support for the
Kurdish armed separatist movement in its south-east.  The relations of the Duma members
with the representatives of the PKK, and the unusual interest of the Russian media in the
supporters of the terrorist organisation exacerbated the Turkish suspicion of an organic link
between Moscow and PKK. On 25 January 1995, a “Kurdish House” was opened in Moscow,
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and some Duma members met PKK officials there.94 The State Duma Committee of
Geopolitics, under the domination of LDPR deputies became a PKK propaganda bureau in the
parliament. Chairman of the committee Viktor Ivanovich Ustinov, agreed to host the “Third
International Conference of the Kurdish Parliament on Exile” on 30 October-1 November
1995, stating that “if Turkey, for the sake of Chechnya, is meddling in Russia’s affairs, we
know how to prevent it.” Although the Russian Foreign Ministry denied official recognition
of theses conferences, Turks believed that without the ministry’s tacit approval, they would
hardly be realised. Turkish Foreign Ministry labelled the affair as a “deep wound that only
Russia could bandage.”95 Unsatisfied with the simple Russian response of “non recognition of
the conference, Turkey, a couple of day after the conference, on 4 November 1995,
announced that it will concentrate troops in its border with Armenia and Georgia in order to
pressure Russia to abide by the CFE limits in the Caucasus.
The relations over Chechnya got tense again with the hijacking of the Turkish
ferryboat “Avrasya”, during its trip from Trabzon to Sochi, by a group of terrorists, who were
Turkish citizens of Caucasian origin on 16 January 1996. The group surrendered without any
resistance after a couple of days, and a considerable part of the confused Turkish population
supported the action. Russian authorities expressed their regret and discontent caused by the
public support, and the “mild” attitude of the Turkish police against the terrorists. Aftershocks
of the Avrasya hijacking followed with a series of public statements of Duma members and
generals in Russia. A member of the Duma Committee of Security, Aleksandr Glebovich
Nevzorov, stated that the PKK is not a terrorist organisation, while LDPR’s Aleksey
Valentinovich Mitrofanov, the new chairman of the Committee of Geopolitics, talked about
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the possibility to sell weapons to the PKK. Members of the high echelons of the Russian
military were also ardently giving verbal support to the “Kurdish cause.” General Andrey
Maklakov criticised Rosvooruzhenie’s efforts to sell helicopters to Turkey to use against the
PKK, and General Yuriy Yefrenov, openly proposed the creation of an independent Kurdish
state in the south-east of Turkey.96 In June another move angered the Turks, when the
Geopolitics Committee decided to form a permanent “Sub-committee on the Kurdish
Question” in June.
While the Duma, particularly its institutions under the control of Zhirinovskiy’s LDPR
was increasing its agitation in the Kurdish question, the government was also giving the
message of reciprocity of the Chechen and Kurdish problems to Ankara. During a visit to
Ankara in July 1996, former Russian Ambassador in Ankara, Albert Chernyshev,
diplomatically warned Turkey, saying; “We must understand each other, people who live in
glass houses should not throw stones.”97 Until the end of 1996, the Kurdish-Chechen tension
persisted, but the situation was mitigated with the signing of the “Protocol of Co-operation
against Terrorism” in mid-December by foreign ministers Çiller and Primakov in Moscow,
according to which both sides will strictly refrain from giving any moral or material support
to the terrorist activities within the other party’s borders.
A couple of Kurdish congresses were organised with the complicity of some Duma
members led by Mitrofanov. His active role in establishing contact with the PKK and LDPR
was confirmed in the testimony of Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the terror organisation.
Mitrofanov personally brought Öcalan to Russia in late 1998, and engineered the LDPR
proposal to the President to grant him political asylum.98 The President and the government
on the other hand, denied involvement in the Öcalan affair and any complicity with PKK
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activities inside Russia. Yeltsin refused to grant asylum to the PKK leader in response to the
Duma appeal for that aim in December, and finally have him deported from the country.
Ankara reciprocated this action which saved bilateral relations about a year later when the
Chechen crisis erupted once more, when Turkey adopted a clear policy of non-involvement in
Russia’s internal affairs.
In November 1999, Ecevit made a controversial visit to Moscow, about a month after
the initiation of the second Chechen campaign of the Russian Federal forces. The timing of
the visit and Ecevit’s description of the conflict as an internal problem of Russia caused a
domestic reaction. He stressed the importance and respect Turkey gave to the territorial
integrity of Russia and the two prime ministers made a joint statement denouncing terrorism.
In addition, he also expressed his and Turkish Nation’s concern about the humanitarian side
of the conflict, the conditions of the civilian people effected by the war. Ecevit’s visit under
such conditions demonstrated the importance he attached to Ankara-Moscow dialogue, and
his government’s will to proceed with the strategy of drying up the sources of support of the
PKK.
The official non-involvement policy of Turkey in Russian internal affairs did not
convince the Russian public, which mostly believed that Turkey was indirectly behind the
insurgence, or at least supplying the rebels with arms and technical assistance. Towards the
end of the first Chechen war, squeezed between the large public support for the Chechens and
relations with Russia, Turkey let the “General Representation of the Chechen Republic of
Ichkeria” headed by the Chechen deputy prime minister Hosh-Ahmed Nukhayov, to
Istanbul,99 but refrained from any official contact with it. The Russian Ambassador to Ankara,
Vadim Kuznetsov warned the government that “if any country recognised the Republic of
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Ichkeria, the most serious consequences would ensue, including the suspension of diplomatic
relations.100
Scenarios about a clandestine plan for erecting a Turkish Empire, which would be
joined by independent Chechnya, were being published in serious newspapers.101 Russian
press was fully aware of the extensive coverage Turkish media gave to the pro-Chechen
interpretations of the Campaign in Chechnya. On 6 July 2000, Turkish court released
Magomet Tagayev, a man wanted in Russia for complicity in terrorist activities. Russian
Foreign Ministry expressed its “regret and surprise against a background of numerous
assurances by Ankara that it will fight all manifestations of terrorism.”102 The hostage taking
incident in Istanbul also exacerbated the image of covert Turkish support for Chechens in the
Russian eyes. The small terrorist group led by a Turkish citizen of Caucasian origin103
stormed the lobby of a grand hotel in Istanbul, taking the clients including Russians hostage.
The crisis ended in two day without spilling blood, however the milder-than-usual treatment
of the terrorists by the police and the large public support placed behind them brought
Russian reaction.
Despite the fierce fight of rhetoric of non-governmental entities in both countries,
governments did not actively oppose each other in the Chechen and PKK affairs. By the
2000s, both countries more or less covered their own Achilles heel, Turkey by a series of
successful operations cutting the support lines of the PKK insurrection and Russia by winning
an incomplete battle on the Chechen flatlands.
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4.3.2. Central Asia
Turkey was the first country to recognise the newly independent states, five days
before the Almaty agreement dissolving the Soviet Union. President Özal had already visited
Central Asia in March 1991, but that was before independence and he was careful to visit
Moscow as a first stop. After independence, the Central Asian heads of state or government
visited Ankara in return, one after another, starting with Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakstan
in September 1991, Saparmırat Niyazov, Islam Kerimov, and Askar Akayev followed suit. In
February 1992, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin toured the five Central
Asian countries, with a crowded delegation of government officials, journalists and
businessmen.
Pleased with the rapid development of the Turkish-NIS relations, Özal hoped to
announce the creation of a Turkic Common market, and a Trade and Development Bank in
the inaugural Turkic Summit held in Ankara in October 1992, nevertheless, the leaders of the
Central Asian states seemed reluctant to commit themselves to an exclusively Turkic
formation, which would automatically rule out other possible sources of economic support,
such as Russia and Iran. The summit was a huge disappointment for Ankara. Even the
prepared press communiqué was not issued since Kazak President Nazarbayev refused to sign
a statement implying the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as
an independent state, on the grounds that a parallel could be drawn between TRNC and the
Kazakstan’s Russian dominated north.104 Similar results were achieved in the following five
summits followed, in Istanbul, Bishkek, Tashkent, Astana and Baku.
The initial euphoria of Turkish fraternity is replaced by a more realistic attitude on the
part of the Central Asians because of several reasons. The Turkish economy and opportunities
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it presented proved not to be a match for the needs of the economic recovery and restructuring
projects of the NIS, while the CIS integration was viewed as more viable option for solution
of economic problems. In addition to the natural attraction of the CIS economic integration,
Russia implemented reactionary policies to cancel out Turkish initiatives towards the region.
Also, the leaders of the Central Asian NIS quickly learned that foreign powers can be played
against each other for their own advantage.
In a couple of years, the Central Asian states understood that the extent of Turkey’s
economic power did not match with their needs. Turkish credit and aid in kind was far from
satisfactory, and their leaderships had to diversify their options of economic assistance.
Their initiation as full members in the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) at the
Quetta Conference in February 1993 was another step for enhancing economic relations
between Turkey and Central Asians. However, the ECO, which was initially comprised of
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, three actual competitors for regional development, proved to be an
ineffective body of co-operation.
Despite the failure in becoming the economic and political leader of the Central Asian
NIS, Turkey, with its Western-style secular democratic system gained a relative success
against its theocratic rival, Iran, as a model for modernisation. The Central Asian leaders
endorsed especially its stance against political Islam, since they saw it as the strongest danger
in the process of state building. In the process, the Soviet educated leaders noticed the use of
a slight appeal to Islam, and its symbols, but considered it a dangerous weapon which should
better be left unloaded for the time being. Turkey also initially seemed to succeed to convince
the Central Asians to adopt a modified version of Latin scripture, when a joint scientific
commission agreed on a 34 letter common alphabet as early as 1992. However, none of the
countries adopted the agreed form, implementing their own versions of Latin script, which
were deliberately differentiated, and used only secondary to the still used Cyrillic alphabet.
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On his last trip to Central Asia, President Özal was reported to be greeted by a Kyrgyz
poet's words; “You left horseback with slanting eyes, and returned by plane with blue
eyes.”105 Unlike the Caucasus, the cultural, social and linguistic differences between the
Central Asian Turkic states and Turkey are incomparably wider. Central Asian Turkic
languages and Turkey’s Turkish are unintelligible for each other's native speakers without
necessary training. Although the Turkic summits are officially called as the Summit of
Turkish Speaking Countries, the lingua franca of the meetings have been Russian, due to the
differences between the “dialects”. There are also profound cultural differences between
Turkish cultural messages and characteristics, and the Sovietised, isolated, and autonomous
cultural heritage and traits of the Central Asian Turkic peoples.106
One major gap between the understandings of Turkey and the Central Asian
leaderships was the latters’ implementation of different tones of authoritarianism within their
countries. Authoritarianism had been useful in keeping the stability and territorial integrity,
and efficiently co-ordinating the efforts for economic recovery in the years of turmoil, but it
also signalled that democracy was not in the agenda of the leaders. The most extreme case is
that of Saparmırad Niyazov of Turkmenistan, who has created a crude Stalinist cult of
personality to honour his own achievements.107 Gigantic portraits of Niyazov, who adopted
the surname “Türkmenbaşı” (The head of Turkmens), are on continuous display around the
country’s cities.108 In Uzbekistan, Islam Kerimov is also encouraging a smaller-scale but
strong cult making of his personality.109 He was re-elected for another five-year term in
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presidency on 9 January 2000, with 91.9% of the total electorate. Besides the personality
cults, most states in the region are controlled by networks of élites based on geographical
association, common education and on extended family ties. Administrations are transformed
into oligarchies, and the legislatures are rather weak with respect to the governments.110
Diplomatic relations between Ankara and Almaty were established when the
permanent Turkish embassy in Kazakstan was opened in April 1992. Kazakstan is a
significant element in Turkish policy toward the region, since it lies between Russia and the
other Central Asian states as a border guaranteeing their independence and prevents Russia to
pursue a neo-imperialist policy. It also distances Russia from the south of Asia, eliminating
Moscow as a threat to energy sources around the gulf.
Kazakstan, however, is disadvantageous against Russia because of its large ethnic-
Russian minority in the northern regions of the country. The region constitutes the largest
bulk of the “Russians abroad”, a frequently used tool of the neo-imperialist elements in
Russia to intimidate Kazak territorial integration or coax Almaty (later Astana) into co-
operation with Moscow. Especially the Cossacks living in the north-west are eager to join the
Russian Federation. Author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn too, called for union of northern
Kazakstan with Russia. Despite the occasional Russian rhetoric about the secession of
northern Kazakstan, few incidents directed to this end occurred. The alleged scheme to
establish a separate state in the north named Russkaya Zemlya in 2000 is one of them. Kazak
officials discovered the scheme and arrested 22 ethnic Russians in Ust Kamenogorsk region.
Considering that Kazakstan’s 12,187 km long borders (6,477 km with Russia) are virtually
indefensible, the Kazak leadership must be extremely cautious in its regional politics. There
are also large groups of Uygur and Chinese on the east, Germans in the west and Uzbeks in
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the south, who disturbingly choose economic and cultural integration with the Uzbeks rather
than Kazaks.
In October 1997, Astana (Akmola) was declared the new capital of Kazakstan. The
new capital was in the centre of the ethnic-Russian-dominated north, thus speculations were
made about the leadership's intention to strengthen Russian influence in the country.
However, coupled with the campaign of Kazakisation, the systematic replacement of ethnic
Russians by Kazaks in the government posts, the reason for changing the capital seems to be
directed to enhance Kazak element in the administration. The huge numbers of ethnic Kazaks
will follow the capital to the north, eventually altering the ethnic composition and decreasing
the demographical advantage of Russians in the region.
Many analysts see Uzbekistan as the most important state and the strongest candidate
for regional leadership.111 Tashkent has many advantages that the other Central Asian do not
have. Uzbekistan, like Turkmenistan benefits from not having a common border with Russia,
and pursue a more independent policy112 and it has a considerable Russian-free population. It
is also the strongest military entity among the others. It set up a National Guard on the basis
of its own Ministry of Internal Affairs troops in January 1992. In the summer of the same
year, the parliament adopted a law on defence that specified the make-up of the country’s
armed forces, to consist of land and air units, air defence forces, a special task force and the
National Guard.113 These unique arrangements made the country the only military power
among the Central Asian NIS, with an operational army and air force. The newly established
air forces were used against the Tajik opposition groups fighting the present government in
early 1993.
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Uzbekistan has a self-image of a “Greater Turkestan”114, and overt ambitions over its
neighbours, especially Tajikistan. Initiating the Central Asian Economic Community of 1994
and joining in the GUUAM group of states in 1999, Tashkent increased its activity and self-
confidence in international politics. Its relations with Turkey are far from stable. After the
assassination attempts against Kerimov in February 1999, the Uzbek president openly accused
Turkey of involvement115. The tension between the two countries increased when he pulled
back Uzbek students having higher education in Turkey and did not attend the sixth Turkic
Summit in Baku which was held on 8-9 April 2000. On the other hand, Turkish-Uzbek
military co-operation continues, through arms shipments from Turkey to Uzbekistan and
technical education of the Uzbek army by Turkish experts. Uzbek membership in the
allegedly anti-Russian and pro-Western GUUAM is another positive step that will possibly
pave the way for greater co-operation between Ankara and Tashkent.
Russian policies in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are very different in
practice. While incinerating and taking advantage of instability and conflict in the Caucasus,
Russia implemented policies to strengthen stability in the Central Asian republics. The main
instrument for this pro-stability policy is direct support for the leaders of these countries.
Despite the nationalist rhetoric of the non-governmental circles, Russia did not encourage any
secessionist movement in Central Asia, because of two reasons; Firstly, conflict and
instability would endanger the large ethnic-Russian minorities in the region, and may trigger
an unmanageable influx of Russians into the Federation, which would be a social and
economic burden hampering the restructuring process; and secondly, that would also
endanger the exploitation and transportation of the rich natural gas and oil resources which
Russia aims to share the revenue.
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Especially after 1993, parallel to its adoption of the “near abroad” approach in its
security assessments, Russian Federation systematically pursued a policy aimed to prevent
Turkey from penetrating into the region and from improving relations with its Central Asian
kin. Russia opposed or criticised every kind of initiative to form unions and co-operative
mechanisms between Turkey and Central Asians. It opposed their membership to the ECO
and reacted negatively to the Turkic Republics Summits. According to Lukin, its is essential
not to be drawn into a confrontation with the bigger Islamic countries (including Turkey and
Iran), but to instead seek various avenues agreements and develop mutually beneficial
interstate relations. “Russia must rebuff all attempts by Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan to
encroach on Russian economic, political and military interests.”116 Turkey’s geopolitical
disadvantage against its regional rivals such as the Russian Federation and Iran, facilitated
Moscow’s success in exclusion. Turkey lost the initiative and effective relations in the region
gradually. Even in the Afghanistan civil war which in the periphery of the target are a of
Turkish policy, Turkey was marginalised, as its protégé, ethnic-Uzbek General Abdürreşid
Dostum was defeated and Taliban consolidated its victory and control over the country.
Turkey aimed to prevent Russia to become the “big brother” and establish another
impermeable domination in the region again. However, the Central Asians leaders perceived
the Turkish resistance to Russia as a deliberate attempt of replacing the starshyi brat with the
ağabey, and themselves displayed a resistance to it.  Having frustrated by the initial fruitless
attempts to tighten the relations between the Central Asian states and Turkey, Ankara finally
changed its attitude towards the region. The efforts of establishing and institutionalising ties
with the motivation of ethnic kinship changed into a less intensive, and less ambitious labour
for co-operation on cultural, social and educational matters. Although Özal’s vision proved to
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be unrealistic, the initial activist euphoria set the direction of Turkish policy towards the
region for the rest of the decade.117
4.3.3. Ukraine
Turkey and Ukraine shared the common goal of preserving the post-Soviet status-quo
in the whole area of former USSR in general, and around the Black Sea in particular. They
formed their bilateral relations as a function of Ukrainian-Russian relations.118 Initially,
Ukraine viewed Turkey as the most important regional power and a representative of the West
to counterbalance Russia’s influence, and a guarantee for its independence, thus Turkish-
Ukrainian relations developed with a quick pace. Kravchuk was convinced that ally-lacked
Kyiv needed an alternative power source to stick, and this source was Turkey with its
perceived potential of regional leadership. He became an ardent supporter of Turkey’s BSEC
initiative in 1991, and welcomed the Turkish aid to the Crimean Tatar population who are in
constant influx to the peninsula. The two countries co-operated with each other on political
and security issues. Turkey’s backing of Ukrainian sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula
and the status of BSF, was reciprocated with Kyiv’s support to Turkish ambitions to alter the
regime of the Turkish Straits, and Ankara’s stance concerning the Karabağ issue.119
Especially after 1994, the West put its support directly to Kyiv, and with this strong
backing of independence, Ukraine’s need for nearer regional actors decreased therefore the
intensification of Turkish-Ukrainian co-operation was cooled. The election of Kuchma as the
President of Ukraine in the Summer of 1994, and his relatively pro-Russian foreign policy
also contributed to the deceleration of bilateral relations between Ankara and Kyiv, however,
the importance both countries give one on other remained on a high level.
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 Turkey has seen Ukraine as the main block against Moscow’s ambitions in the Black
Sea region, and a guarantee for the security of the Turkish Straits. According to the strategists
in  Ankara, the weaker Russia is in the Black Sea, the securer the Straits become.  The huge
power imbalance between Turkey and Russia has been reduced enormously since 1991, and
Ankara is quite delighted because of this change in the scales.
Besides the security factor, another major focus of Turkish interest in the Ukraine is
the Crimean peninsula, a land which has a tremendous historical importance for the Turks.
Since the Crimea is one of the major cradles of Turkish nationalism120 and over 5 million
Crimean Tatar descendants live in Turkey, its psychological importance is substantial. The
Crimean diaspora in Turkey is highly interested in the region, a considerable share with the
desire of returning to the peninsula and most of them concerned with economic and cultural
assistance to the growing Tatar community. The Turkish government undertook some projects
such as the construction of houses and social activity centres for the incoming Tatars to their
homeland, initiated in the summer of 1994 by President Demirel during a visit to Ukraine.
4.4. Reinforcing Turkish Policy in Eurasia
After 1998 Turkey proved that it had the necessary military muscle and political will
to intimidate its neighbours. The country’s image as a deterrent military might was peaked by
the political surrender of Hafez El-Esad of Syria to Turkish military threat, successful
operations against the PKK in northern Iraq, and eventual capture of its leader in Nairobi. The
threat of Islamic extremism and terror was also being countered successfully since the fall of
the Çiller-Erbakan government. Getting rid of the most important internal and external threats
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one by one Turkey, became increasingly self-confident in its policies. Especially after 1998,
Ankara has focused its attention on the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Although it has never been published or leaked out in full, main topics of the National
Security Policy Document of the Republic of Turkey (Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi –
MGSB) are no secret; Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic terror are considered as then main
internal threats to the country’s security. Before its dissolution, the Soviet Union and
Communism were perceived to be the primary threats to Turkey’s external security, but the
focus was shifted towards Greece and Iran after 1992. The latest major update of the
document was made on the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu – MGK)
meeting on 31 October 1997, under Yılmaz’s coalition government, and “strengthening the
relations with Turkic Republics and supporting their leaderships” were emphasised as a
priority of Turkish foreign policy.121  On another MGK meeting on 21 August 2001, Turkey
decided to reassess its Caucasian and Central Asian policy and launch a new diplomatic
“offensive” toward the region.122 According to the new plan, diplomatic representation in the
region will be strengthened in quantity and quality; military relations and assistance will be
intensified, especially in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan; “special attention” will be paid to the
regional conflicts and disagreements such as the Karabağ, status of the Caspian Sea, and
Islamic terror; and the co-ordination and coherence between the government institutions’ and
organisations’ policies towards the region will be enhanced.123
As stated earlier, the pipeline derby had became the core of Turkish foreign policy,
since the Russians frustrated overambitious Turkish efforts to establish dominant influence in
the Caucasian and Central Asian states one by one, thus Ankara canalised its efforts to secure
the Baku-Ceyhan route as the main medium of transport for the Caspian oil. OSCE Istanbul
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Summit presented an opportunity to enhance the Turkish project, and a number of agreements
were signed by the heads of states of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia on the Baku-Ceyhan oil
pipeline on 18 November 1999.
Progress in bringing Azerbaijan out of Russia’s shooting range was also made.
Azerbaijan’s presidential adviser Vefa Gulizade proposed for a NATO base on the Apşeron
Peninsula in January 1999124. He also proposed a formal military alliance with Turkey,
mainly aimed enhancing safety of the pipelines, parallel to the planned GUUAM joint
pipeline security force. The chairman of the pro-government Azerbaijani National Congress
Party, İhtiyar Şirinov, also voiced his wish of joining the NATO system, signing a military
co-operation treaty with Turkey, and accepting NATO or Turkish military bases in
Azerbaijan.125
Turkey launched another initiative for peace and stability in the Caucasus by early
2000, following the tense period between Russia and Georgia over the alleged Georgian help
to the Chechen rebels. On an official visit to Georgia, President Demirel proposed a Caucasus
Stability Pact, which would be modelled after the Balkans Stability Pact under the framework
of OSCE on 15 January 2000. Demirel’s proposal was seen as a possible step towards a sort
of regional co-operation that will assure security of the Caspian energy routes.126 The Pact
proposal foresaw a joint effort of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, under the
trilateral support of the EU, Russia and the US, to enhance the security by co-operation in the
security field, pay effort for regional and multi-regional integration by upgrading the BSEC
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into a Black Sea-Caucasus zone which would be instrumental in enlarging the area of co-
operation to the Caspian. Georgians and Azerbaijanis welcomed the proposal, while Russians
took their time in responding, until Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov’s visit to
Ankara in May, bringing with him Russia’s answer to Turkey’s “Caucasian Stability Pact”
proposal. Armenians have proposed their own security model based on a 3+3+2 format in
which a system of regional security would be drawn up by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
guaranteed by Russia, Turkey and Iran, and sponsored by the US and EU.127 Despite the
initial interest it attracted, the stability pact idea remained an idea, since nothing concrete
followed since.
On the strategic track, latest developments seem to offer a relative success in Turkish
influence in the Republic of Azerbaijan. An important step to take Azerbaijan out of Russian
cultural sphere came from the parliament, which banned the official and public use of the
Cyrillic alphabet in the country by 1 August 2001.128 Recently, Turkish-Azerbaijani military
co-operation is also increasing significantly.  Azerbaijani Military Academy, whose lecturers
are mostly Turkish officers, gave the first graduates in 25 August 2001.129 The graduates
paraded in uniforms, which are almost complete replicas of the Turkish Army’s, with Turkish
military marches on the background. Before the parade, General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, Chief of
General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces was honoured by President Aliyev, with the
highest decoration of state, “The Flag of Azerbaijan”130.
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CONCLUSION
  Russian Federation, although lost its full control of the region and global political
influence, still boasts a massive nuclear arsenal, and continues to be a great power with
formidable might and potential. Its geopolitical advantages drawn form its colossal size,
historical and infrastructural relations with the neighbouring countries, growing economic
power and the “great power mentality” of its political élite may translate naturally to a neo-
imperialist policy over the post-Soviet states, and revival of the Union. For the decade elapsed
it, Moscow proved not to be adequately ambitious for such a revival, or possibly simply not
capable of achieving it, however, it should be remembered that a decade is shorter than the
life span of the Weimar Republic.1 The rhetoric of the Russian politicians from Kozyrev-
Yel’tsin to Putin evolved into a much more assertive tone through years, but Russia still
seems to be incapable of matching it actual foreign policy conduct with its rhetoric.
Following a large-scale domestic debate between the Western-prone "Atlanticists" and
conservative "Eurasianists" on the new character of the Russian State, its foreign policy
priorities, methods of formulation and conduct, and mainly the "national interests", Russia re-
entered the post-Soviet space in a more assertive manner after 1992-1993. It projected its
economic, political and military might to the “near abroad”; Caucasus and Central Asian
regions, where Turkey also intend to establish itself as a new regional power in the post-
Soviet “power vacuum”. Ankara and Moscow, waged a small-scale cold war for dominant
influence in the intersection areas of their spheres of interest, but both had paid extreme
caution on not allowing the tensions spill over the whole of the bilateral relations. Currently,
Russian Federation seems to have the upper hand in this rivalry, because of geo-strategic
                                                          
1 For an interesting comparative analysis on post-Soviet Russia, and the Weimar Germany, see Galina
Starovoitova, “Modern Russia and the Ghost of Weimar Germany,” in Heyward Isham, ed., Remaking Russia:
Voices from Within, M.E.Sharpe, Armonk, 1995, pp. 129-145.
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advantages it possesses. The Soviet Union left behind a legacy of infrastructural dependence
to Moscow and seed of ethnic conflict all over its internal periphery, as a result of Stalin’s
carefully planned and implemented nationality policies and federal border arrangements.
Furthermore, most of the ex-Soviet republics are led by former politburo members and
regional Party leaders, who are not physically or psychologically uncomfortable with
continued dependency to Moscow. In the short term, it seems extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to break this interdependence between the former Soviet Republics and the
Russian Federation, and among each other.
For the first time in generations, Russian interests are defined in regional rather than
global terms, and the new theoretical framework that shapes the Russian way of viewing the
international affairs is realpolitik.2 On the Turkish side, the country’s attitude in foreign
affairs has evolved into a more active one, breaking the traditional policy of relative isolation
and non-intervention. Despite clashing interests, Turkey saw Russia as a possible partner in
an alternative alignment in Europe, after of frustration EU Luxembourg summit. Positively,
Turkish-Russian relations have been relieved of the overpowering tension and total mistrust
bred by the perception of Russia as the enemy.3 The demonic archenemy images of both
nations faded considerably, thanks to the developing ties in the economic interaction and
tourism. However, it should be remembered that Turkish-Russian dialogue has been born
largely out of necessity, because of the two countries’ respective weaknesses; Russia being
economically crippled, and Turkey being excluded from Europe. Reluctantly, they chose to
downplay the rivalry on the strategic arena, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, while
concentrating their efforts on enhancing trade. Despite the relative success in sustaining
                                                          
2 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy,” in Karen Dawisha, ed., The
International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E.Sharpe,
New York, 1997, p. 61.
3 Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Turkish-Russian Relations a Decade Later: From Adversity to Managed Competition,”
Perceptions, vol. 6, no. 1, March/May 2001, p. 83.
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friendly bilateral relations particularly in the economic field, the basic character of ındırect
bilateral relations over the ex-Soviet territory does not promise a bright future, since neither of
the rivals have an intention to share the benefits of collaboration, and behave extremely
exclusionary towards each other, especially in the Caucasian and Caspian energy politics. If
this nature persists, political tension and possibly confrontation would be likely, no matter
how cautiously foreign policy will be conducted.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY
1990
January Riots in Baku, Soviet army intervention. Ayaz Mütellibov was installed as
president of Azerbaijan.
4 March Republican elections in Russia.
13 March Abolition of the CPSU’s leading role (Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution).
14 March Gorbachev elected president of the USSR by the Congress of People’s
Deputies.
May Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR.
12 June Declaration of sovereignty of RSFSR by the Congress of People’s
Deputies of RSFSR.
12 June Ivan Silayev appointed Prime Minister of RSFSR.
20 June RSFSR declared sovereignty.
20 August Gagauz SSR was constituted inside the USSR.
3 September A Russian SSR was proclaimed in Trans-Dnyester.
Ion Snegur became the President of Moldova.
11 October Yeltsin assumed the authority of premier. Kozyrev appointed foreign
minister of Russia.
25 October Kazakstan declared state sovereignty.
20 December Eduard Shevardnadze resigns as Foreign Minister.
1991
January Baltic Crisis in the Soviet Union.
15 January Bessmertnikh appointed Foreign Minister of the USSR.
17 January Gulf War began.
25 February Military Wing of the Warsaw Pact is abolished at Budapest Summit.
11-16 March Turgut Özal’s visit to the Soviet Union.
17 March Referendum on the preservation of the USSR.
23 April Gorbachev and leaders of the nine republics sign the preliminary Union
Treaty. Starting the “Novo-Ogaryovo Process” for replacing the USSR
with a loose confederation.
12 June Yeltsin elected as the first President of the RSFSR.
23 June Yılmaz Government replaced Akbulut’s. Safa Giray appointed Foreign
Minister.
18 August Gorbachev kidnapped by August Coup plotters.
19 August “August Coup” launched, the White House besieged by Soviet troops.
21 August Latvia declared independence.
21-22 August Coup fails because of the mass demonstrations.
24 August RSFSR declared independence. Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary
of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
24 August Ukraine declared independence.
25 August Belarus declared independence.
27 August Moldova declared independence.
30 August Azerbaijan declared independence.
31 August Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan declared independence.
5 September State Council set up by Congress of People’s Deputies to govern in
emergency.
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6 September Cevher Dudayev seizes the power with a coup in Chechnya.
6 September Leningrad renamed as St. Petersburg.
7 September Baltic States recognised by RSFSR.
9 September Tajikistan declared independence.
21 September Armenia declared independence.
23 September Communist coup in Tajikistan.
27 October Turkmenistan declared independence.
27 October Dudayev elected president of Chechnya.
1 November COMECON dissolved.
1 November Chechnya seceded from the Russian Federation.
9 November Turkey recognised Azerbaijani independence.
19 November Shevardnadze returns as Foreign Minister of the USSR.
20 November VII. Demirel Government in Turkey. Hikmet Çetin appointed Foreign
Minister.
26 November Prime Minister Demirel criticised Azeri annulment of Karabağ’s
autonomy as contrary to regional stability.
1 December Ukrainian referendum for independence passed by 90.3%.
1 December Nazarbayev was elected President of Kazakstan.
7 December Russian, Ukrainian and Belarussian leaders sign an agreement creating the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Belovezhskaya Pushcha.
8 December Declaration of the CIS. End of Soviet Union as a geopolitical reality and a
subject of international law.
10 December Kazak SSR renamed into the Republic of Kazakstan.
12 December Five Central Asian presidents agree to join the CIS in Ashgabat.
16 December Kazakstan declared independence.
16 December Turkey recognised Armenian independence.
21 December Almaty declaration on the foundation of the CIS.
23 December Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan joined the CIS.
24 December Russia took over the Soviet seat in the UN Security Council.
24 December Yeltsin closed Pravda and disbanded Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.
25 December The RSFSR renamed as the Russian Federation.
25 December Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR.
29 December Russian-Armenian Friendship and Security Treaty.
31 December USSR officially ended.
1992
January Turkish International Co-operation Agency (TICA) was founded to co-
ordinate Turkish aid to and projects in the Central Asian NIS.
14 January Establishment of diplomatic relation between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
20-22 January Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin’s visit to the Russian Federation.
4 February Kozyrev’s visit to Turkey for a meeting of Black Sea littoral states. A
friendship and co-operation treaty was signed..
26 February Armenian capture of Hocalı.
28 February Prague CSCE summit confirmed that Karabağ is a part of Azerbaijan.
Work for creation of the Minsk Group was initiated.
2 March Turkey began to control air traffic to Armenia.
20 March Kiev CIS Summit.
24-28 March Çetin’s tour in Central Asia.
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31 March Federal Treaty between Russia and its autonomous republics (except
Chechnya and Tatarstan).
20 April South Ossetia called for Russian sovereignty.
21 April Founding  of permanent Turkish Embassy in Kazakstan
May Department for the Relations with CIS States introduced in Russian MFA
May Armenian capture of Şuşa.
14 May "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Russian Federation on Setting up of a Joint Economic
Commission for Trade and Economic Co-operation" was signed in
Ankara.
15 May Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) supporters march to the parliament.
Mütellibov forced to flee the country. Isa Gamber, an APF member
became acted president
15 May Treaty on Collective Security signed by Russia, Armenia, Kazakstan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. (Turkmenistan refused to sign on
the grounds that it prefers bilateral relations even within the CIS).
17 May Armenian capture of the Laçin corridor.
18 May General Pavel Grachov was appointed Russian Minister of Defence.
25 May Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed
between Kazakstan and Russia.
25-26 May Prime Minister Demirel’s visit to Russia. "Treaty on the Basis of
Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation"
was signed.
15-16 May Tashkent CIS Summit. Collective Security agreement concluded.
7 June Ebulfez Elçibey was elected President of Azerbaijani Republic.
15 June Yegor Gaydar appointed as Prime Minister.
24 June Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed
between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.
25 June Yeltsin visited Turkey to attend BSEC Summit in Istanbul.
25 June Heads of states or governments of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and
Ukraine signed in Istanbul the summit declaration on the BSEC, thus
setting up a regional structure of multilateral co-operation in various fields
of economic activity.
6 July Moscow CIS Summit.
25 July Inception of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in the Istanbul Summit.
7 October Azerbaijan had withdrawn from the CIS as the Parliament refused to
ratify the Almaty Agreement..
30 October "Co-operation Agreement between the Ministry of Interior of the
Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Interior of the Russian
Federation" was signed in Moscow.
30-31 October First Turkic Summit in Ankara.
2-6 November The first meeting of the Turkish-Russian Joint Economic Commission
was held in Ankara.
30 November ECO which originally consisted Turkey, Iran and Pakistan expanded to
include the five Central Asian post-Soviet republics.
14 December Viktor Chernomyrdin appointed Prime Minister in Russia.
16 December Interagency Foreign Policy Commission created by Yeltsin within the
Security Council.
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1993
3 January START-II signed by Yeltsin and Bush.
22 January Minsk CIS Summit; 6 of 10 members sign CIS Charter.
25 January “Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” was issued.
February The Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC was founded.
1 March Hikmet Çetin’s visit to Russia.
9 March Turkish-Azeri agreement on the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline was signed by
Turkish Foreign Minister Çetin and his Azeri counterpart Bagirov.
11 March Turkish speaking countries agreed to adopt a common alphabet.
11 March Congress of People’s Deputies passed resolution limiting powers of the
government to implement economic reforms.
19 March Georgian parliament accused Russia of waging an undeclared war against
Georgia with the aim of detaching Abkhazia from the rest of the country.
4 April Armenian capture of Kelbecer corridor.
14-16 April Özal’s visit to Baku. The President declared that a Turkish-Azerbaijani
military alliance is possible.
23-26 March Congress of People’s Deputies  attempted to impeach Yeltsin.
25 April Referendum for confidence on reforms. 58.5% supported Yeltsin and
52.8% supported economic reforms.
30 April UNSC Resolution 822, which called for the withdrawal of foreign and
local Armenian forces from occupied territory in Azerbaijan.
16 May Demirel elected President by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
28 May Russian forces under General Shcherbak completed withdrawal from
Azerbaijan.
June Hüseyinov’s coup ousted Elçibey and replaced him with Aliyev.
25 June I. Çiller Government.
27 July Sochi Agreement on Cease Fire in Abkhazia and on the Control
Mechanism of its Observation was signed by representatives of Georgia,
Abkhazia and the Russian Federation.
31 August Soviet troops withdrawn from Lithuania.
8-9 September Çiller’s visit to Russia. it was agreed to set up Turkish-Russian Working
Groups in the fields of industry and transfer of high technology, energy
and transportation. Those working groups started to function shortly after
and several meetings were held in Turkey and in Russia.
September Azerbaijan rejoined the CIS.
21 September Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of RF dissolved
by Yeltsin.
22 September Congress of People’s Deputies appoints Vice President Rutskoy
“president”.
2-4 October Storming of the Ostankino TV Station, Mayor’s office and the House of
the Soviets.
2 November “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” was adopted by the
Security Council.
18 November Yeltsin signed the decree establishing the arms export-import company to
be known as Rosvooruzhenie.
12 December Elections of first federal assembly of Russia and referendum to ratify the
new Constitution.
23 December Turkmenistan and Russia sign a treaty giving Russians in Turkmenistan
the right to have dual-citizenship.
28-29 December Azerbaijani foreign minister Hasan Hasanov visited Turkey.
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1994
11 January New Turkish Straits traffic regulations were promulgated.
3 February Georgia and Russia signed a treaty allowing Russia to establish permanent
military bases in Georgia and station troops on the border with Turkey.
8-11 February Haydar Aliyev’s visit to Turkey.
28 March Treaty of Military Co-operation was signed by Kazakstan and Russia.
29 March Nazarbayev offered an “Eurasian Union” of CIS states in Moscow.
1-6 April The second meeting of the Turkish-Russian Joint Economic Commission
was held in Moscow
20 April "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Russian Federation on Co-operation in Military
Technical Matters and in the Field of Defence Industry" was signed in
Moscow.
5 May Azerbaijan signed the PfP Treaty.
6 May Aliyev visited Turkey to discuss future political and military strategies.
9 May Mass demonstration outside the Lubyanka calling for the restoration of
the Soviet Union organised by Rutskoy and adherents.
12 May Mass demonstration at the Ismailovskiy Complex lamenting USSR
organised by Zyuganov.
22 June Partnership for Peace Framework Document signed by Russia and NATO.
1 July The new regulations regarding the maritime traffic through the Turkish
Straits and the Sea of Marmara went into effect.
15-20 July Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets visited Ankara for
debt rescheduling related to the Turkish Eximbank loans extended to the
USSR.
19 July Debt rescheduling agreement signed by Turkey and Russia concerning the
loans expanded to the Soviet Union by Turkey between 1989-1991.
27 July Russian engineered cease fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
27 July Mümtaz Soysal appointed Foreign Minister of Turkey.
20 September The “Contract of the Century” was signed between the Western Oil
Consortium and SOCAR, state oil company of Azerbaijan.
24 September Treaty of Economic Union signed by nine CIS members.
18-19 October Turkic Summit in Ankara.
28 November Murat Karayalçın appointed Foreign Minister of Turkey.
28 November Russian Security Council voted to send troops to Chechnya.
11 December Russian troops invaded Chechnya. First Chechen War launched.
20 December AIOC formed by the Azerbaijani government.
1995
1 January The CSCE renamed the OSCE.
20 January CIS Customs Union was founded by Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan.
25 Jnauary Kurdish House opened in Moscow.
March Statute on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued.
17 March Coup attempt against Aliyev in Azerbaijan. Çiller government and MİT
were blamed of involvement.
16 March Armenia accepted two Russian bases into its territory.
27 March Erdal İnönü appointed Foreign Minister of Turkey.
9 May Prime Minister Çiller attended the ceremony on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of the end of the World War II in Europe, which was held in
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Moscow and also held official talks with Premier Chernomyrdin.
30 June The second BSEC summit meeting of the heads of state or government
was held in Bucharest.
25 August Bishkek Turkic Summit.
14 September President Yeltsin’s decree on “the Affirmation of the Strategic Course of
the Russian Federation with Member States of the CIS.”
18 September Second Summit of Turkish Speaking Peoples in Istanbul.
21 September Second Turkish World Summit in Izmir.
? October Russian-Moldovan treaty granting more autonomy to the "Dnyester
Republic" and withdrawal of Fourteenth Army from Moldova.
15 October II. Çiller Government. Coşkun Kırca appointed Foreign Minister of
Turkey.
30 Oct-1 Nov “Third International Conference of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile”
organised with the support of the Russian State Duma Committee of
Geopolitics in Moscow.
4 November Turkey announced that it would begin to concentrate troops in the border
with Armenia and Georgia.
5 November III. Çiller Government. Deniz Baykal appointed Foreign Minister.
15 December Debt rescheduling agreement signed on the basis of the terms and
conditions of the "Paris Club Agreements". Under these arrangements
Russia's debt repayment to Turkey will be made in semi-annual
instalments with the last payment taking place in the year 2011.
15 December Turkish Eximbank will make available 350 million dollars in new credits
for financing the export of Turkish goods and services to Russia thus
bringing the total amount of Turkey's credit facilities to Russia to 950
million dollars.
17 December Russian Duma elections held. CPRF dominated elections.
1996
5 January Kozyrev resigned.
9 January Yevgeniy Primakov appointed  Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
January Hostage crisis in Chechnya.
16 January Hijacking of the Turkish Black Sea ferry “Avrasya” by a group of
terrorists led by Muhammet Tokcan, a Turkish citizen of Caucasian
origin.
29 March Integration accords were signed by Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and
Kyrgyzstan in Moscow.
2 April Russia and Belarus signed the “Agreement on the Formation of a
Community”.
April Russian sources announced that Chechen President Dudayev was killed.
12 April II. Yılmaz Government in charge in Turkey. Emre Gönensay replaced
Baykal as Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
16 June First round of Presidential elections in Russia was held.
26 June Ukraine adopted new constitution.
3 July Second round of Presidential elections was held. Yeltsin beat Zyuganov in
run-off.
8 July Erbakan’s coalition government in charge in Turkey. Çiller assigned as
foreign minister.
14-18 July The Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Mustafa Kalemli
paid an official visit to Moscow to sign the “Protocol on Co-operation
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between the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Federal Assembly
of the Russian Federation.”
5 August Chechens took Groznyi back.
14 August Primakov re-appointed foreign minister.
17 October Yeltsin removed Lebed from his post of Secretary of Russian Security
Council.
21 October Fourth Summit of Turkish Speaking Peoples held in Tashkent.
25 October President Demirel visited Moscow to attend the third summit meeting of
the BSEC.
28 November Lukashenka signed new constitution and replaced Belarussian parliament.
1 December Russian troops began withdrawal from Chechnya.
17-19 December Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Çiller visited Moscow. A
“Memorandum on Co-operation in the Field of Combating Terrorism”
was signed.
1997
April Union Treaty signed between Russia and Belarus.
26 May Russian-Belarus Union Charter signed by Yeltsin and Lukashenka.
28 May Russian Ukrainian agreements on the Black Sea Fleet.
31 May Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership, by
which Russia endorsed Ukrainian territorial borders.
11 June Russian-Belarus Union Charter went into effect.
28 June Tajik Peace and Reconciliation Accord signed in Moscow.
30 June III. Yılmaz Government in charge in Turkey. İsmail Cem appointed
foreign minister.
24 July Russian MFA condemned Turkish proposal to integrate Northern Cyprus.
10 September Kremlin spokesman Sergey Yastrzhembskiy said that Russia will pull out
of the S-300 deal in return of withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northern
Cyprus.
10 October Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan formed the GUAM in
Strasbourg.
14 October Russian Foreign Ministry dismissed Turkish concerns over the S-300
missiles being supplied to Southern Cyprus.
16 October Russian Foreign Ministry distances itself from the meeting of several
Duma deputies with Osman Öcalan, a PKK leader.
20 October Astana (till 6 May 1998 - Akmola) is declared the capital of Kazakhstan
by the President’s Decree
25 October Azeri oil started to flow from Baku to Novorossiysk via Groznyi.
6 November Russia expressed concern about Turkish military manoeuvres in Northern
Cyprus.
11 November Russian Foreign Ministry said that Turkey must withdraw its forces from
northern Iraq.
13 November Boris Nemtsov said that Azerbaijan should use both the Russian and
Turkish pipelines to export its oil.
29 November Viktor Chernomyrdin and Güneş Taner discuss gas supplies to Turkey.
12 December Turkey was declined as candidate state for EU in the Union’s
Luxembourg Summit.
15-16 December Chernomyrdin visits Turkey. Deal for a gas pipeline was signed.
17 December “National Security Concept (Blueprint) of Russian Federation” issued.
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1998
6 January Russian MFA criticised US-Israeli-Turkish naval exercises to be held in
the Eastern Mediterranean saying it could undermine the security of Arab
states.
15 January Russian MFA criticised Turkish co-operation with Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus.
9 February Russian MFA expressed concern about Turkish troops in northern Iraq.
19 February The head of LUKoil, Vagit Alekperov, and Turkish Energy Minister
Cumhur Ersümer hold talks in Moscow on the transport of Russian oil via
Turkish territory and LUKoil operations in Turkey.
20 February Turkish and Russia foreign ministry officials held talks in Moscow on
strategic stability.
1-2 March Foreign ministers meeting in Ankara on transport of Caspian oil and gas
to world markets. Russia and Iran was not invited.
4 March The Russian Duma appeals to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to
“grant special political status to the Kurdish regions.”
23 March Yeltsin sacked Chernomyrdin, appointed Sergey Kiriyenko prime
minister.
24 April Kiriyenko confirmed as prime minister
18-21 May Turkish Chief of General Staff Karadayı’s visit to Russia.
27 May Russian MFA condemns Turkish military activity in Northern Iraq.
5 June BSEC Charter declared in Yalta Summit of the Heads of State.
22 June Russian MFA calls for demilitarisation of Cyprus.
6 July Declaration between Kazakstan and Russian Federation on everlasting
friendship is signed.
7 July The MFA said that it is perplexed by Turkey's intention to propose to
NATO the creation of so-called special peacekeeping forces for the
Caucasus region within PFP. It also called for dialogue between Turkey
and Greece on Cyprus.
10 July Greek Cypriot Defence Minister Ioannis Omirou visited Moscow.
13 July Greek Cypriot President Glafkos Klerides visited Moscow. Yeltsin
confirms the supply of S-300 missiles go ahead.
20 July Russian Duma speaker Gennadiy Seleznyov visits Ankara.
3 August Russian envoy to Cyprus Vladimir Chizov talked with Turkish and Greek
Cypriot leaders.
August Russian financial crisis.
23 August Yeltsin sacked Kiriyenko, called back Chernomyrdin as interim prime
minister.
10 September Chernomyrdin resigned as Duma rejected him twice.
11 September Primakov was appointed prime minister, Igor’ Ivanov was appointed
foreign minister.
2 October Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin and Igor’ Ivanov to the Security
Council.
6 October Russian MFA condemned Turkish attacks on PKK bases in Iraq.
9 October Abdullah Öcalan brought to Russia by LDPR Duma deputy Mitrofanov.
16 October Russian State Duma issued a statement criticising the Turkish occupation
of Northern Cyprus.
26 October Zhirinovsky visited Turkey.
29 October Igor’ Ivanov’s visit to Turkey for the 75th anniversary of the Republic.
6 November Turkey adopted a revised set of regulations regarding the Turkish Straits
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traffic.
7 November Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeyev visited Turkey to discuss
Cyprus.
8 December Turkey threatened to tighten the rules for passage of oil tankers through
the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.
1999
11 January IV. Ecevit Government in Turkey.
26 January Turkish and Russian officials discuss CFE Treaty in Ankara.
12 March Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary became members of NATO.
24 March Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of 31
May 1997, giving Russia the right to use Sevastopol as its main naval
base for twenty more years.
24 April Uzbekistan joined the GUAM, to change name into GUUAM.
12 May Primakov sacked. Stepashin proposed for Prime Ministry.
13-15 May Impeachment attempt against Yeltsin, eventually failed.
19 May Stepashin appointed prime minister.
19 May Russian MFA condemns Turkish military activity in northern Iraq.
28 May V. Ecevit Government in TR.
7-9 June Turkish organised Georgian-Abkhazian Summit in Istanbul.
29 June Igor’ Ivanov expresses regret at the passing of Death sentence on
Abdullah Öcalan.
9 August Stepashin cabinet sacked by Yeltsin. Putin appointed prime minister.
August Chechen armed incursion into neighbouring Dagestan.
17 August Major earthquake in north-western Turkey
September Chain of large-scale urban bombings in Russia in Moscow, Volgodonsk
and Buynaksk, which left nearly 300 dead.
30 September Russian armed forces moved into Chechnya.
27 October Massacre in the Armenian parliament, leaving prime minister Vazgen
Sarkisyan and eight deputies dead.
4 November Treaty on co-operation between Kazakhstan and Belarus for 1999-2008 is
signed
4-6 November Ecevit visited Moscow to meet Putin. 4 agreements were signed.
? November OSCE Summit in Istanbul.
8 December Yeltsin and Lukashenka signed the treaty that created the Union State
composed of Russia and Belarus.
12 December Turkish MFA condemns Russian random violence targeting civilians in
Groznyi.
31 December Yeltsin resigned as President. Putin became the acting president.
2000
10 January New “National Security Concept of Russian Federation” was adopted by
the Security Council.
15 January President Demirel visits Georgia, and proposes a “Caucasian Stability
Pact”.
26 January Turkish State Minister Abdülhaluk Çay called for a ethnic Turkish
community of Azerbaijan and Central Asian states.
18 February Çay condemned the Russian genocide in Chechnya.
28 February Klebanov visited Turkey. Turkey and Russia set up a commission of
123
military co-operation.
1 March Chechen emissary Yandarbiyev visits Turkey.
26 March Presidential Elections in Russia. Putin becomes President.
28-29 March Demirel visits Turkmenistan.
8-9 April Sixth Turkic Summit in Baku. Kerimov and Niyazov did not attend.
Kasyanov appointed Prime Minister.
12 April The "Agreement between the Government of Turkey and the Government
of the Russian Federation on Co-operation in the Maritime Areas in the
Black Sea" was signed in Istanbul on April 12, 2000
19 April Turkish MFA expressed appreciation of Russian Duma’s ratification of
START II Treaty.
21 April Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted.
13 May Putin signed the decree ordering the creation of seven “federal districts”
within Russia.
16 May Demirel’s term as president expired. Ahmet Necdet Sezer elected as X.
President of Republic of Turkey.
21-23 May Turkish MFA under-secretary Loğoğlu’s visit to Moscow.
25 May Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov’s visit to Ankara, bringing
with him Russia’s answer to Turkey’s “Caucasian Stability Pact”
proposal.
25 May Upper house of the Kyrgyz parliament adopted Russia as an official
language.
28-29 May Cem’s visit to Azerbaijan.
10 October Eurasian Economic Union was found with the agreement signed by
Russia, Belarus, Kazak, Kyrgyz and Tajik presidents, as a body to replace
the CIS customs union on the model of EU.
23-25 October Kasvanov’s visit to Turkey.
2001
7-8 June Igor’ Ivanov’s visit to Turkey. Discussions between Turkish and Russian
officials were concentrated on economic relation and the Blue Stream
Project.
1 August Azerbaijan banned the use of Cyrillic alphabet.
10 August Construction of Trans-Black Sea gas pipeline (within the Blue Stream
Project) was started.
24-26 August Turkish Chief of General Staff, General Kıvrıkoğlu visited Azerbaijan.
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